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Preface
A dear professor and friend of mine told me some years ago that all good philosophy is
self-reflexive – that is, it allows us to put into words those forces, emotions, and structures that
peer over our shoulder, from manger to coffin. Such clarity is the renewed and continued prize that
the study of philosophy awards us, but it also comes at a cost. Becoming aware of what has given
birth to the form and content of our everyday experiences simultaneously reveals to us what is
wrong with them. Simple “facts” of life – poverty, anguish, hunger – are no longer presented to us
as eternal and ephemeral phenomena that seem to have just been willed out of nothingness; instead,
they are revealed as specific confluences of social and historical processes that are themselves
available for explication. With this, the weight of all the world, so to speak, comes down upon us,
and for the first time, we know our finitude, powerlessness, and apparent inability to alleviate the
suffering of others. Of course, the more stubborn among us do not see this judgment as final, but
rather as a choice: either we resign ourselves to what is, or struggle to create what could be, even
if such struggle is ultimately fruitless.
But this realization merely leaves us with the knowledge that there is a problem. Now the
question is what must be done about it – and such a question is a terribly difficult one. It is a
question whose answer is not decided in a single decisive moment. Instead, it is like a war of
attrition, with both belligerents dedicating themselves to research, to adaptability, searching for
that one answer that will finally break the stranglehold, for better or worse. Each of us, as human
beings, confront this stranglehold, and our specific methods of coping with this lack of air vary.
My own lies in the study of philosophy. I have been fortunate in that I have studied under
professors that have repeatedly reminded me of one fact: philosophy is anything but abstract and
idle, and in those rare instances that it is, it should not be. Wielded properly and adroitly, it can
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serve as a powerful tool for social change. This drive has been the inspiration and genesis of this
thesis.
Yet the pursuit of any drive requires a certain measure of resolve, in order to fend off whatever obstacles pose themselves along the path. Many of these seem innocuous enough. Like any
other child educated in the United States, I was indoctrinated by the school system into believing
that the nation was a beacon of progress: the more time passes, the more injustices will simply
fade away. Embarrassments in the country’s history that disprove this idyllic conception of history,
such as the proto-fascist Ku Klux Klan, were barely paid attention to, if they were mentioned at
all. Again and again, I was educated into viewing the United States as the champion of life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness. I steadily grew disillusioned with this premade vision as I aged, but
the culmination of my disillusionment did not occur until November 2016. At the time, I was reading the works of the neo-Marxist Frankfurt School, which already cast the political climate of
modern America in a very unfavorable (but illuminating) light. This, combined me with the disappointing choice (to put it lightly) that the American electorate made in the same month, spurred
me into realizing then that the ideals of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness were not truly
meant for me, nor for many others. They never were and they never will be. It is very easy to speak
of such rights – it is another thing to grant them.
But to do so would require a reversal of what is for what could be. Poverty has a cause,
hunger has a cause, the sheer boredom and alienation that mark everyday life under modern society
have a cause, and this cause – at least in part – is capitalism. As the very structure that determines
the daily rhythms of our lives, it cages us into one class or the other. If we are of one class, we
spend 40 years, or even more, repeating an empty cycle of working to live; working to both keep
ourselves alive and line the pockets of those exploiting us, who cast their relationship to us as one
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of benevolent philanthropy. If, however, we are of the other class, we can savor a life of comfort
and excess and go dance on the backs of the bruised, with caviar in one hand and wine in the other.
Such wrongness is not exactly hidden from us either. Directly visible from the border highway in
El Paso, there is a smattering of homes in Ciudad Juárez, Mexico, that are very obviously barely
able to stand. Meanwhile, the chairman of Western Refining, an oil company on this “right” side
of the border, enjoys a net worth of over a billion dollars. It is hard to swallow such a “fact” of life.
Of course, despite my Marxism, I do not pretend at pure altruism either. There is a degree
of self-interest in my politics as well. Jean-Paul Sartre’s existential novel Nausea contains a passage that has proved very personally resonant to me, and encapsulates what I mean much more
pleasantly than I could ever express it:
Nothing happens while you live. The scenery changes, people come in and go out, that’s
all. There are no beginnings. Days are tacked on to days without rhyme or reason, an interminable, monotonous addition. From time to time you make a semi-total; you say: I’ve
been travelling for three years, I’ve been in Bouville for three years. Neither is there any
end: you never leave a woman, a friend, a city in one go. And then everything looks alike:
Shanghai, Moscow, Algiers, everything is the same after two weeks. There are moments –
rarely – when you make a landmark, you realize that you’re going with a woman, in some
messy business. The time of a flash. After that, the process starts again, you begin to add
up hours and days: Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday. April, May, June. 1924, 1925, 1926.
That’s life. (Nausea 39)
This feeling – of nothingness, of monotony and boredom – is one that I would argue is endemic to
existence. It cannot be avoided, though its severity and specific expression wanes from moment to
moment. No matter its particularities, however, we each react by attempting to cover it over with
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some meaningless pastime; some empty hobby to mask the sheer emptiness of what goes on. Most
of the time, we succeed. The anxiety fades under an interminable din of office telephones ringing,
idle talk at a bar, glasses clinking, and the repeated punctuation of an alarm clock in between, and
we convince ourselves that this is freedom. Should this existential tightrope snap, though, the readymade “advice” for us is to attempt to rectify this issue within ourselves; our happiness, after all,
is solely our responsibility. Certainly, there cannot be any sort of external state of things that is
causing such rampant suffering.
Or at least that is what certain actors would like us to uncritically believe. This characterization of existence under capitalism raises a question – not coincidentally, the one that inspired
this thesis. To put it flatly: are the material conditions of capitalism amenable to an authentic life,
in which we can be true to ourselves? My answer is a resolute no, but with a few qualifications. I
conceive of existential authenticity as possible within capitalism, but isolated to only a few scattered pools of resistance. The authentic life is thus caged by the very material system of capitalism,
and consequently, we have no choice but to submit to the gunpoint drudgery of labor that is not
our own, of working to live rather than living to work:
And the worker, who for twelve hours weaves, spins, drills, turns, builds, shovels, breaks
stones, carries loads, etc. – does he consider this twelve hours’ weaving, spinning, drilling,
turning, building, shovelling, stone breaking as a manifestation of his life, as life? On the
contrary, life begins for him where this activity ceases, at table, in the public house, in bed.
(“Wage Labour and Capital” 205)
Surely, things can get better than this. But much hazier is how we may make revolution reality.
The proletariat, the fabled revolutionary class of Karl Marx’s theory of history, has so far failed to
fulfill its destiny, preferring instead the falsity of fascism to the truth of liberation. And, when it
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grows bored with fascism, it reverts to a cursory faith in a liberal democracy that gives both the
left and right wings of capital free play. The power of capital appears to be absolute, with no end
in sight. So, we come to the burning question: what is to be done?
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Abstract
The purpose of this thesis is threefold: firstly, to argue for the possibility of a Heideggerian
Marxism through demonstration; secondly, to attempt to establish the foundation for a future phenomenology of capitalism; and thirdly, to attempt to redress Karl Marx’s weak theory of alienated
subjectivity. I do this through the gradual development of a new concept that I have come to call
being-in-capital. The first chapter is thus generally dedicated to preparation, concretized through
a familiarization with Martin Heidegger’s system of thought, as embodied in four of his works:
Being and Time, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” the “Letter on Humanism,” and “The Question
Concerning Technology.” Following this engagement with Heidegger, we come to Karl Marx’s
Capital, Volume One, “The German Ideology,” and “The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts
of 1844,” whose purpose is to supply the materialist half of being-in-capital. The third chapter
seeks to investigate being-in-capital as an effect of the post-industrial decline of Detroit, Michigan.
Concluding the thesis are a few words on the difficulties involved in the creation of a Heideggerian
Marxism.
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Introduction
The answer begins with the frank acknowledgement, as we have already done, that the
proletariat does not seem likely to seize the means of production any time soon. It then continues
in asking why this is the case. The 20th century seemed to sound out the death rattle of capitalism,
and then, as surely as the revolution seemed at hand, it faded into nothingness. There are many
explanations one can ascribe to this: the degeneration of the Soviet Union into totalitarian bureaucracy, the constant intervention of Western capitalist powers, the material state of the countries that
claimed to be on the path to communism, and so on. But it is my view that one of the most salient
reasons, although it tends to go unnoticed, is that Marxism tends to not address us. By this I mean
that, while its critiques of capitalism are unmatched, its great weakness is its lack of a compelling
theory of subjectivity – and there is hardly a way to convince anyone to wave a red flag without
understanding how they experience their subjectivity. This is the same problem the theorists of the
Frankfurt School attempted to correct with Freudian psychoanalysis, after the horrors of the Holocaust led them to a similar sort of despair.
My answer is thus founded on a desire to bring a stronger theory of subjectivity to Marx.
Thankfully, we do not have to start from scratch in pursuing it; the study of our experience of the
world and how we apprehend it has long been the concern of phenomenologists. So, we turn to
one of their cardinal saints: Martin Heidegger. In his Being and Time, he tells us of an existential
category he refers to as Geworfenheit in the original German – translated, “thrownness.” Though
the complexities and particularities of this term alone could probably fill another thesis, I find that
introducing it here, in an informal manner, will explain why I chose to revisit both Heidegger and
Marx.
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At the start of the preface, I metaphorized the obtaining of philosophical awareness as not
unlike a feeling of having the world come down on us. In that moment, whether reached through
formal study or not, we come to terms with the fact that, without choice or prior warning, we have
been thrown into the world. We have been thrown into a certain conglomeration of historical, social, cultural, and political factors, none of which we have had any opportunity to decide on for
ourselves. We question why they have intruded upon our lives, but they reply with only silence –
and this is a very frustrating silence. We are given no choice: we must contend with them as we
come to comprehend both ourselves and our relation to them. Thus, we find ourselves in the world
and recognize that we have been thrown into it. Our past, shaped by these conglomerations, is
inescapable: always there, looming, to be confronted and reconciled with our present and future,
if possible.
Of course, the elaboration of this concept of Geworfenheit naturally leads one to ask about
the specifics of their own thrownness. Piece by piece, we construct a general image of the society
in which we live, noting its major forces, e.g., religion, the family, the economy, schools, etc. This
general image is able to be taken both as its own object of study and, when recognized as deeply
influential to our own development as human beings, as part of us. This is central to Geworfenheit,
and, in truth, to Heideggerian thought as a whole. The human being, called Dasein (“there-being”)
in Heidegger’s works, is therefore inseparable from history. Dasein is always in history, in society,
and it cannot ever rid itself of this thrownness. To do as much, even if it were possible, would be
to lose both its identity and its ability to determine its possibilities of being-in-the-world, whether
authentic or inauthentic.
What is part of us is what matters to us – and this is the question that orthodox Marxism
cannot answer. When a mass of workers in a country rife with poverty and lack of education asks
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what it can offer them, it answers with great narratives about history, about the proletariat coming
to conquer its own alienation through a series of class struggles. To someone with little familiarity
with Marxist thought, this is nonsense. And the characterization of one as “proletarian” functionally covers over one’s Being – though there is little doubt that Marx’s ultimate desire for communism was founded in a desire for freedom, the proletarian is not only a proletarian. He probably
does not even think of himself as such, considering the lack of class consciousness in most parts
of the world.
So, the question “What matters to the proletarian?” emerges. Phrased more suitably for
our efforts, “What matters to you?” Philosophically, I believe the way to answering this is through
a rehabilitation of Marx via a Heideggerian phenomenology of capitalism. I conceive of this phenomenology as revolving around a number of sources of intelligibility: the tool, the sign, Das Man,
the artwork, and language. It is through these sources that, gradually, Dasein gains its understanding of itself and its thrownness. Each of these five finds a specific expression in a new concept I
refer to as being-in-capital. Being-in-capital itself has its own way of being, while simultaneously
provoking a change in Dasein’s self and world-understanding via the five sources of intelligibility.
The first chapter, then, will be solely dedicated to Heidegger, who will serve as the phenomenological half of my analysis. Four of his writings will be covered: Being and Time, “The
Origin of the Work of Art,” the “Letter on Humanism,” and “The Question Concerning Technology.” From Being and Time I draw the concepts of Dasein, alētheia, Zuhandenheit, the Mitwelt,
and Das Man. The remaining writings will then build upon this foundation in order to segue neatly
into Marx, who will be the subject of chapter two. From him, I take Capital, Volume One, particularly the section on the fetishism of commodities, “The German Ideology,” and “The Economic
and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844.” In the third and final chapter, I bring the two men together
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in order to perform an applied analysis of the material-existential conditions of the city of Detroit,
Michigan, and make most apparent this phenomenon of being-in-capital. I close with a few words
on the work that remains to be done, if our goal is the creation of a Heideggerian Marxism.
Something else remains to be said. Although they are not the subject of this thesis, several
other theorists have found the combination of Marx and Heidegger particularly fertile. Most notably, Herbert Marcuse, Kostas Axelos, and Gianni Vattimo and Santiago Zabala have tried to synthesize Heideggerian phenomenology with Marxist materialism. A fully developed Heideggerian
Marxism has not yet come into being, however. Each of these philosophers have begun from similar grounds, but their ultimate ends and focuses have rarely coincided. To complicate matters
further, perhaps the most significant contribution, Marcuse’s, was abandoned in its infancy. Marcuse lost hope when his teacher and friend, Heidegger himself, embraced the fascist dogma of the
National Socialists. The antipathy that developed between these two, emblematic of the larger
conflict between Marxists and Heideggerians, was then reinforced by perhaps the most aggressive
Marxist critical theorist of all, Theodor Adorno, who committed entire lectures to dismantling
Heidegger’s “cult of death” (138).
Clearly, the project of Heideggerian Marxism is not something easily undertaken – but it
is undertaken with all due seriousness. And it is certainly not something I can complete in 120 or
so pages. But what I may do is become the dwarf that stands on the shoulders of giants, and add
my own small contribution to the question at hand. Now, we may begin.

4

“Higher than actuality stands possibility.”
Martin Heidegger

“Philosophers have thus only interpreted the world; the point, however, is to change it.”
Karl Marx
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Fig. 2: Edvard Munch – The Kiss – 1897
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Chapter 1 – Martin Heidegger
§1. Being and Time – Introduction
Somewhere in the National Gallery in Oslo there is a painting named The Kiss. Its contents
are relatively mundane – two figures, a man and woman, are embracing one another. Their arms
form a sort of cradle, lending one the impression that they are melting into each other. Neither the
face of the man or woman can be seen clearly. Their features are blurred, distorted, obscured by
the kiss they share. Though the pair clearly serve as the focal point of the painting, the light of a
small window disrupts the otherwise gloomy background.
To me, The Kiss is a remarkably quotidian artwork. There are no great depictions of miracles, as in those pieces dedicated to venerating Christ or other religious figures. As the lovers’ faces
are smoothed over, their identities do not matter – the painting is not a portrait. Nor is The Kiss
intended to commemorate some crossroad in history; there are no revolutionaries, tyrants, or guillotines within its frame. All we are presented with is, very simply, a kiss. On the one hand, we
might be somewhat frustrated with this apparent lack of detail. We begin to wonder who perhaps
were this man and woman that Edvard Munch painted in 1897, what their lives were like, where
their homes were. Did they stay lovers? Were they happy? Did they exist at all in the world or did
Munch simply dream them? Of course, none of these inquiries of ours will receive an answer. At
the time of the writing of this thesis, Munch has been dead for 76 years.
The only recourse we have is to consider what The Kiss might mean for us as individuals.
Naturally, this meaning would be particular to each person admiring the painting. It could be that
the embrace of the lovers reminds one person of someone in their past. In someone else, it might
awaken hope that they will find themselves in a similar pose soon. For the happiest among us, The
Kiss would likely inspire a phone call to their partner. The Kiss is ambiguous in this way– but it is
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due to this ambiguity that each admirer of the painting can find something in it for themselves.
Munch’s work seems to symbolize an experience that all of us will share at some point in our lives.
There is no one among us that has not been or will not be one half of the subjects of The Kiss.
Because of this seemingly universal relevance, The Kiss embodies a special sort of philosophical significance. It tells us something of Being – of what it means “to be,” to exist in the
world. This question takes us from the realm of art to the realm of philosophy, as the question of
Being has long been the domain of philosophers. Out of all of them, however, there is one that
distinguishes himself in his study of the nature of Being: Martin Heidegger. Thirty years after The
Kiss was completed, Heidegger ignited a philosophical revolution with the publication of his magnum opus, Being and Time. Its introductory pages form an accusation, a sharply written one.
Heidegger charges the past two millennia of philosophical thought with gradually entombing this
question, telling us, quite acerbically, that:
It is said that ‘being’ is the most universal and the emptiest concept. As such it resists every
attempt at definition. Nor does this most universal and thus indefinable concept need any
definition. Everybody uses it constantly and also already understands what is meant by it.
(Being and Time 1)
It is not difficult to see how this error has ingrained itself so deeply in our intellectual traditions.
In everyday conversation, we say that things “are” insofar as they exist in physical space. We say
that the book “is in” the library, or the bourbon “is in” the pantry. We are not technically incorrect
in describing them like this. But to say that we “are” in the world in the same style as the bourbon
or the book “are” is to confuse the Being of humanity for the Being of objects, and face Heidegger’s
stern condemnation as a consequence. The question at the heart of Being and Time, then, emerges:
“What do we mean by the expression ‘to be,’ especially as it relates to human beings?”
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For the sake of practicality and relevance, however, we will not labor through the entire
structure of Being as it is described in Being and Time. To do so would lead us into territory much
more precarious and difficult than Heideggerian Marxism, which is already a challenge in itself.
Consequently, if we are to ultimately stay theoretically relevant to being-in-capital, we must limit
our coming analysis of Being and Time to four major concepts: Dasein, alētheia, Zuhandenheit,
and Das Man. Each of these will prepare us for the transition to Marx, especially after we delve
into Heidegger’s later writings.
§2. Dasein
Consider all the standard explications of humanhood that seem to surround us whenever
we think philosophically. Perhaps most readily and uncritically, we tend to define human beings
as purely biological or anatomical beings – a particularly-shaped arrangement of a brain, heart,
lungs, etc. But alternatively, if we look to some of the constitutions and treatises of the political
history of the earth, we could argue that a human being is an individual and rational being endowed
with inviolable rights. If we instead adopt a Freudian lens, individual humans become a confluence
of irrational and unconscious psychological drives. None of these conceptions of humanity necessarily or certainly cancel one another out, but they do not get to the heart of Being. To a biologist,
a human being “is” that arrangement of organs. To a certain kind of political theorist, a human
being “is” a rational individual with God-given natural rights. To a Freudian psychoanalyst, a human being “is” Eros and Thanatos. “Is” is always followed by a predicate, a descriptor. “Is” in
itself is not their concern – but it is Heidegger’s, and ours as well. As a result, since “to be” is a
much more complicated phenomenon than these partial explanations can accurately encompass, it
would be somewhat inappropriate and misleading to call us “just” human beings. We must be
named something else, something more descriptive of what it means to be: Dasein. That is
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Heidegger’s name for us and the ontological structure of our individualized existences. Dasein is
the being that, as he writes, “…does not simply occur among other beings. Rather [Dasein] is
ontically distinguished by the fact that in its being this being is concerned about its very being”
(Being and Time 11).
The bourbon and book, as simple objects, lack any sort of capacity for self-awareness. Nonhuman animals are in a similar predicament. In spite of possessing the ability to react to instinctual
need and physical stimuli, they do not reflect on their lives. Insofar as it comes to the faculty for
awareness of its own life, Dasein stands alone. Its ontic and ontological differentiation from other
beings does not mean, however, that Dasein somehow chooses to enter the world of these beings
from time to time. Dasein is instead equiprimordial with existence; it is always already in the
world, concerned with it, soliciting it, and molding it. As Heidegger declares,
being-in is not a ‘property’ which Dasein sometimes has and sometimes does not have,
without which it could be just as well as it could with it. It is not the case that human being
‘is,’ and then on top of that has a relation of being to the ‘world’ which it sometimes takes
upon itself. Dasein is never ‘initially’ a sort of a being which is free from being-in, but
which at times is in the mood to take up a ‘relation’ to the world. This taking-up of relations
to the world is possible only because, as being-in-the-world, Dasein is as it is. (57)
This sentiment is expressed most cohesively in the literal translation of Dasein itself: “beingthere.” Being-in is thus revealed as an existential – or fundamental category of Dasein. Both Dasein
and the book and bourbon are “in” the world, but their mode of being-in is irreconcilably distinct.
What must be explicated now, then, is one of the essential modes of being-in of Dasein.
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§3. Being-in-the-World
Our interpretation of Dasein as being-there introduces us to another problem. We have established that being-in is an existential of Dasein. But being-in, left as it is, really only signifies a
non-descript category of general hereness or thereness. It is as if we ended our sentences about
Dasein abruptly, not providing any helpful information, e.g., “Dasein is.” This is true, but what we
want to know is what Dasein is in its world – what it is preoccupied with, working on, and so on
and so forth. This is the only manner in which Heidegger will be made useful as a partner to Marx
later on in this thesis. The transcendental structures of the phenomenon of Being must be filled
with real phenomenological content in order to be of any relevance to us. Otherwise we simply
remain in the same sort of abstract, metaphysical description that Heidegger castigated at the beginning of Being and Time.
The quandary that preoccupies us now is how Dasein experiences the world – how it encounters it, how it is there. This encountering is marked by a mood of concern: “’Ich bin’ [‘I am’]
means I dwell, I stay near…the world as something familiar in such and such a way” (Being and
Time 55). Dasein “dwells” only in a place it is concerned about, in a place that matters to it. Dasein
is involved in the world, unlike a physical object such as the book or bottle of bourbon. It interacts
with its world. It does not perceive it passively. Thus, the being-in-the-world of Dasein is defined
by its possibility of taking care. Dasein is concerned about and cares for its world. Heidegger tells
us,
With its facticity [or actual way of being], the being-in-the-world of Dasein has already
dispersed itself in definite ways of being-in, perhaps even split itself up. The multiplicity
of these kinds of being-in can be indicated by the following examples: to have to do with
something, to produce, order and take care of something, to use something, to give

11

something up and let it get lost, to undertake, to accomplish, to find out, to ask about, to
observe, to speak about, to determine…These ways of being-in have the kind of being of
taking care of [Besorgen]…The term “taking care” has initially its prescientific meaning
and can imply: carrying something out, settling something, ‘to straighten it out.’ The expression could also mean to take care of something in the sense of ‘getting it for oneself.’
(57)
Notice that Heidegger adheres to relatively ambiguous descriptions here, as evidenced by his repeated use of the word “something.” Dasein is always already involved with the world – that much
is clear, but how it is involved with its world changes according to the Dasein we are taking for
our object of study.
This is a somewhat difficult concept to grasp immediately, but it can be clarified relatively
easily. The Being of my Dasein is not the same as the Being of the Dasein of a subsistence farmer.
This is to say, very simply, that our lives are unlike one another’s. We are concerned with different
things. We take care of the world in different ways. The world reveals itself to us in a manner
singularized to us. For instance, if our minds were suddenly exchanged, and I awoke in his bed
and he in mine, both of us would find ourselves deeply confused. He would likely take a look at
this thesis and feel somewhat lost. Correspondingly, I would stand in the middle of his crops and
throw my hands up in frustration and bewilderment. Dasein is individualized in this way – though
all of us share in its general structure, the particular content of said structure changes from circumstance to circumstance; from one world to another. Thus, what distinguishes me from the subsistence farmer is the content of our being-in-the-world.
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§4. ἀλήθεια, the Tool, and the Sign
We can shed further light on this by dedicating a little more attention to this phenomenon
of “world.” It is the case that being-in-the-world and taking-care-of have a certain kind of modality
to them. The world does not appear to us in one mode at all times. To “know” part of the world is
to “know” one of its modes of presentation. Taking-care-of something in any particular region of
engagement with the world (understood as the center of Dasein’s dwelling and not as the literal
physical “world”) can only be done with knowledge of said region. To refer back to our examples
of the biologist, sociologist, and psychoanalyst, they each “know” a given “clearing” of the presentation of the world. This might be made more apparent if we apply this to a certain object – say, a
hand. If I look at my hand as a biologist, it consists of five fingers, each made of bone, muscle,
ligaments, tendons, and so on. A sociologist might see my hand as the mechanical tool that actuates
the labor that allows me to survive in my particular material conditions. A psychoanalyst could say
that my hand, assuming it is a common theme in my dreams, signifies something entirely unlike a
hand. Their knowledge is what allows them to take-care-of their analyses in such distinct ways.
The world, then, much like existence itself, is not simply one static “thing” that can be understood
coldly, at a distance. Neither is taking-care-of. The existential world discloses itself according to
the manner in which we phenomenologically appropriate it. To know something is an activity on
the part of Dasein, and the conditions of this activity change according to the worldliness of the
world Dasein is immersed into.
The worldliness of the world announces itself through alētheia, or unconcealment. Alētheia
is Heidegger’s theory of “truth,” in a manner of speaking. But unlike the other formulations of
truth that have persisted throughout the history of philosophy, unconcealment is interpretive. The
truth of the world and of the objects that reside within it are not disclosed to Dasein as eternal and
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unchanging “essences,” but as repositories of meaning, in which a vast network of hermeneutic
references is contained. This idea of Heidegger’s, too, is somewhat unintuitive, but it can be exemplified as such – this time last year, I decided to take upon myself the task of modifying a certain
part on my motorcycle. In doing my work, I had to resort to using several tools, including a torque
wrench. Thus, in the moment that I took the wrench into my hand to either loosen or tighten the
engine bolts, I was engaged in a specific “mode” of unconcealment. The existential what-for of
the torque wrench showed itself to my phenomenal consciousness as a torque wrench, and as a
result, I was able to use it in-order-to work on my motorcycle, toward the larger goal of modifying
it, for-the-sake-of protecting it in the event of a drop. This hermeneutic path is in turn representative
of the equipmental mode of unconcealment that is most proper to the use of a torque wrench. All
of this occurs intuitively and unconsciously – it is not as if I had to think about every turn of the
wrench.
The significance of this movement is that alētheia is distinguished not as the essence of
truth, but as the phenomenological ground through which truth shines. The worldliness of the
world materializes in the manifold “truths” that a certain object contains. Given that the torque
wrench possesses the phenomenological character of Zuhandenheit (“handiness”) and is located
within a specific referential situatedness – as revealed by the fact I would not use a hammer to turn
a bolt – truth would come about through a recognition of its referential situatedness and the interpretation of it as such. Joseph Rouse supplies us with another example:
One cannot encounter a rook as such without some grasp of the game of chess. In
Heidegger’s terms, the ‘discovery’ of chess entities (pieces, positions, moves, or situations)
presupposes a prior ‘disclosure’ of chess as the context in which they could make sense.
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The ‘being’ of rooks or knights is their place within the game; that is what confers their
intelligibility as the entities they are. (125)
Unconcealment, then, is phenomenologically prior to truth. Truth is always there to be discovered
– but the only manner in which this can occur is through a phenomenological appropriation on the
part of Dasein.
Our analysis has hitherto generally adhered to Zuhandenheit as the mode in which alētheia
expresses itself. We have taken for our objects of investigation physical tools through which Dasein
concretizes its projects. This is not a fault on our part: equipmental handiness is what largely guides
Dasein’s everyday navigation of the world. We are in the mode of Zuhandenheit when we type on
our laptop computers, drive our cars, clean our kitchens with a rag, etc. This is how we discover
that the “hammerness” of the hammer suits itself to driving and pulling nails, and the “wrenchiness” of the wrench suits itself to tightening and loosening bolts.
But handiness is hardly limited to these “proper” tools. What of those moments in which
Dasein is not working on anything at all? It appears that situations such as these propel both
Heidegger and us into an explanatory abyss – handiness, as it has been articulated so far, cannot
adequately make sense of these situations. Even so, this is a merely superficial problem that dissolves as soon as we consider the other ways that Dasein moves through its world. Suppose that
Dasein, bored with its daily routine, visits a nearby forest. It is late afternoon – the sun is far past
its apex. The individual Dasein we are taking for our example enjoys solitude, and quietly, placidly,
it breathes in the forest air. Suddenly, though, Dasein is jolted out of its stillness. Phenomenologically, it has detected certain claw marks on the trunks of several trees. They do not seem unthreatening, as if they belonged to a small prey animal. Choosing caution, then, Dasein decides to go
home – it has no interest in being hunted by some predator. In a similar situation, another individual
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Dasein could be lounging in the sun on a beach a few hundred miles away. It feels the warmth of
the sun on its skin, closing its eyes in pure serenity. This moment only lasts for a few seconds.
While Dasein’s eyes are shut, a cluster of dark storm clouds appears on the horizon, cracking and
flashing with lightning. Aiming to protect itself, Dasein takes its towel into its arms and goes to
continue its rest in safety.
Neither of these instances repeat the sort of “practical” handiness that we have been working with so far. Instead, Dasein reacts to these modifiers. It appropriates them as signs, which
“…are themselves initially useful [handy] things whose specific character as useful things consists
of indicating [Zeigen]” (Being and Time 76). Dasein does not take these signs for itself in nearly
the same manner as the hammer or torque wrench, but nonetheless, it listens to its indications and
changes its behavior accordingly. With this knowledge in mind, we move onward.
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Fig. 3: Edvard Munch – The Scream – 1893
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§5. The Mitwelt and Das Man
The introduction of sign-reference allows us to transition to the next relevant point from
Being and Time. Certain signs that Dasein encounters in the everyday world imply the presence of
others. Perhaps Dasein finds an old axe strewn amongst the trees in the forest, or the sandals of a
child buried in the sand of the beach. The phenomenological recognition of these objects by Dasein
brings Dasein into the Mitwelt – the with-world. Dasein sees that other objects and signs are part
of the being-in-the-world of other Dasein, and so acknowledges that these objects are useful for
other Dasein. These Dasein are encountered as such:
The field…along which we walk ‘outside’ shows itself as belonging to such and such a
person who keeps it in good order, the book which we use is bought at such and such a
place, given by such and such a person, and so on. The boat anchored at the shore refers in
its being-in-itself to an acquaintance who undertakes his voyages with it, but even as a
‘boat which is unknown to us,’ it still points to others. The others who are ‘encountered’ in
the context of useful things in the surrounding world at hand are not somehow added on in
thought to an initially merely objectively present thing, but these ‘things’ are encountered
from the world in which they are at hand for the others. (Being and Time 115)
The structure of relationality that was revealed through our discussion of Zuhandenheit is here
preserved, but simultaneously adapted to the phenomenon of being-with-one-another. As Dasein
engaged with the tools surrounding it through concern, it deals with other Dasein in the mode of
solicitude. Other Dasein must be grasped as other Dasein, and the manner in which my own Dasein
cares for them similarly depends on the character of the Mitwelt I share with that particular Dasein.
I “care” for my friends in a fashion that is unsuited to the way I “care” about my mother. The same
holds for how they care for me.
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Their manner of relating to my individual Dasein can manifest itself in either an authentic
or inauthentic expression, which is decided by how they choose to concern themselves with the
projects I myself, as Dasein, care about. Heidegger advises us that:
[The solicitude of the other] can, so to speak, take the other’s ‘care’ away from him and
put itself in his place in taking care, it can leap in for him. Concern takes over what is to
be taken care of for the other. The other is thus displaced, he steps back so that afterwards,
when the matter has been attended to, he can take it over as something finished and available or disburden himself of it completely…In contrast to this, there is the possibility of a
concern which does not so much leap in for the other as leap ahead of him in his existentiell
potentiality-of-being, not in order to take ‘care’ away from him, but rather to authentically
give it back as such. (118-119)
Despite the effort Heidegger’s language usually solicits from the reader, again, we can put forth a
simple illustration.
Love, as emotion and action, serves as perhaps the most visible motivator for both inauthentic and authentic taking-care-of-another. It takes the shape of the former when, in its intensity,
it suffocates the object of love. In our concern for someone else, we may unintentionally commit
the error of stifling them for the sake of protecting them. To exemplify: in January 1952, the equally
renowned and reviled Marxist revolutionary Ernesto “Che” Guevara embarked on the journey that
would eventually become his Notas de viaje. It was not an especially well-planned trip, as Che
was only accompanied by his friend, Alberto Granado. Their only method of transportation was a
500cc Norton motorcycle that, tragically, broke down about halfway through the nine months they
were away. Che’s voyage through South America, which thrust him into the viscera of capitalism
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– poverty, suffering, hunger, exploitation – is often credited as instrumental in his becoming the
Che that entered history.
Doubtlessly, Che seized his authentic potentiality-of-being-a-self in doing this. But suppose that his mother and father, out of their love for him, had not let him leave Argentina. Anxious
over what could happen to their eldest son, they would have leapt ahead and overridden the authentic manifestation of the care of Che, as Dasein. Immediately, they would have suffocated it
with an emphatic “No.” The Dasein of Che would have thus been forced to languish in the mire of
inauthentic everydayness just a little longer, putting off its own-most potentiality-for-being-a-self
in the frustrating indetermination of “One day.”
As for authentic love, there is a quote from the German philosopher Walter Benjamin that
could best encapsulate it: “The only way of knowing a person is to love them without hope” (OneWay Street 62). Loving someone without hope, without expectation, is what makes this leapingahead authentic. This sort of love ultimately constitutes a recognition on the part of Dasein that the
Dasein of others is just as much an individual self as it is itself, and that, if it is to authentically
bring their possibilities back to these others, it cannot project its own desires and ambitions on
them. In short: authentic leaping-ahead is characterized by a help that does not smother the potentiality-of-being-a-self of Dasein. It is the love that emerges when two people let one another be, in
all their projects and possibilities, and care for each other anyway.
So it is that we are introduced to the quite ponderous matter of who Dasein is. Dasein’s
immersion into the Mitwelt “revolutionizes” it. It must now take hold of who it is, in view of these
others. Consequently, Heidegger’s analysis of being-with is perhaps one of the most foundational
sections of Being and Time. Significant effort must be dedicated to understanding it and unpacking
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it in its entirety – it is imperative that we do this if we are to produce an ultimately fruitful investigation of a Heideggerian Marxism.
Our exegesis on Heidegger began with The Kiss. It told us something of Being, of something we all share in. Being-with-one-another, then, may be adequately represented by another of
Munch’s artworks – a much more famous one, at that. Four years prior to his completion of The
Kiss in 1897, Munch produced a much darker composition: The Scream. It is everything The Kiss
is not. Rather than embodying that sense of melting into one’s love, as The Kiss did, The Scream
thrusts its viewer into profound nothingness. An uncomfortable identification with the solitary figure at the center of the painting occurs. It is standing on a bridge, underneath a red sky. The shape
is vaguely humanoid, but much like its counterparts from The Kiss, not much else can be said about
it. Its clothes do not indicate any sort of wealth, social class, or national origin. Neither the background nor foreground communicate anything substantial about either the time period or location,
save for a few ships in the distance. There are two shadowy shapes lurking behind the principal
figure, seemingly walking away, oblivious to its anxiety. Yet the most striking aspect of the painting is the figure itself – it is locked into a piercing scream, hands clasped to its face. It is not looking
straight ahead, toward the spectator, but a little off to its right. Besides the orientation of its eyes,
though, we are not granted any further clues as to just what is making the screamer scream.
Heidegger would likely have an answer for us. As in the case of The Kiss, the identificatory
features of the screamer are nondescript, blurred. Because of this, the screamer lends itself to the
interpretation that it is not one particular person, but perhaps a representation of humanity in general. The possibilities that we could project on the character and history of the screamer are near
limitless. It could be a man or woman, wealthy or destitute, or something else that does not even
occur to us. Its specific reasons for screaming change according to the persona it “adopts,” but
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nonetheless, it screams, primally and existentially. If we take Munch’s screamer as a precursory
symbol for Dasein, we may bring Heidegger and Munch together once more – Dasein, as the
screamer, screams because it has lost itself. It has been dispossessed of its own potentiality-forbeing-a-self, deprived of its own authentic individuality by an unseen, omnipresent authority. That
is what the figure within The Scream cannot help but look at. Dasein has lost itself. Heidegger
characterizes this relationship formally, like so:
…Dasein stands in subservience to others. It itself is not; the others have taken its being
away from it. The everyday possibilities of being of Dasein are at the disposal of the whims
of others. These others are not definite others…One belongs to the others oneself, and entrenches their power. ‘The others,’ whom one designates as such in order to cover over
one’s own essential belonging to them, are those who are there initially and for the most
part in everyday being-with-one-another. The who is not this one and not that one, not
oneself, not some, and not the sum of them all. The ‘who’ is the neuter, the they. (Being
and Time 122-123)
The they, also called Das Man in the original German, is the invisible lawgiver, the unseen authority to whom we appeal in everyday life. When we look for a source of guidance on how to handle
our possibilities as Dasein, very often, we resign ourselves to the choices that the they has already
prescribed for us. We say what they say, think how they think, and do what they do just because it
is what they do. When the they speaks, it voices out the shallow, incessant conversation that pretends at providing a structure, eternally true and entirely unquestionable, to our years upon this
earth.
Dasein relates to the they in three particular ways: distantiality, averageness, and levelingdown. The first of these is not very difficult to grasp. Individual Dasein always takes its first steps
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into comprehending its own Being at a very young age, especially in adolescence. Without warning, it seems as if we are cast into an “existential crisis,” to use the popular term. Details about the
being-with-one-another of our own individual Dasein – who we care about and who we are in
relation to them – grow a little clearer, at times gradually and at others, violently. We start to establish ourselves as separate from those around us, from the pronouncements of the they. We uncover the distance that has and always will be present between us and them, and
…there is constant care as to the way one differs from them, whether this difference is to
be equalized, whether one’s own Dasein has lagged behind others and wants to catch up in
relation to them, whether Dasein in its priority over others is intent on suppressing them.
(122)
To give an example – let us say someone is raised Catholic. Uncritically, they accept the dogma
they were taught in Sunday school and at Mass. They go so far as to receive their First Communion
at the age of nine. Over the course of some six years or so, their relationship with God slowly
atrophies. They stop attending Mass, and rarely ever pray, but for some reason, continue identifying as a believer. Then, they slowly begin to ask themselves, “Why do I believe in God?” Ultimately, they arrive at the conclusion that they did so because they were simply taught to by others.
They find this unsatisfying, and so they become an atheist. Naturally, this would provoke all sorts
of reactions from the other Dasein that surround them; some of whom would push to bring them
back into the faith every chance they get. They are uncomfortable with the distance which separates
their Dasein from that of Das Man, and so they seek to erase it.
But as we have seen, the they is the existential-ontological expression of the neuter. It is
neither nonbeliever nor theist, man or woman, rich or poor. It cannot be explicitly identified with
a specific class of Dasein that has chosen a certain mode of Being or been thrown into a certain
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kind of facticity. The they is just as likely encountered in a relatively simple five-minute conversation with a stranger as with one of our closest friends. Moreover, we should not make the mistake
of believing here that the relationship between Dasein and the they is wholly antagonistic – Das
Man is as much an existential of Dasein as Zuhandenheit or the Mitwelt are. Ultimately, it is part
of Dasein, part of its they-self. The they does not actively and maliciously choose to cover over
Dasein’s authentic possibilities, it simply does because that is the constitution of its Being in itself.
And in doing this, it exercises its everyday character, averageness, upon us. From Heidegger, once
more:
Overnight, everything that is original is flattened down as something long since known.
Everything won through struggle becomes something manageable. Every mystery loses its
power. The care of averageness reveals, in turn, an essential tendency of Dasein, which we
call the leveling down of all possibilities of being. (123)
So, it is the case that distantiality, averageness, and leveling down converge into the larger existential of Dasein known as publicness. Publicness “disburdens” Dasein of the question of how to
navigate its world, what to be concerned with, how to be concerned with whatever it is concerned
with, and so on (124).
§6. Being and Time – End
The they will play a heavily significant role in our applied analysis of Heideggerian Marxism. For the moment, however, we are finished with it. We may now summarize the disparate
elements of Being and Time as a unified whole for the first time. As was mentioned at the very
start of all this, Heidegger fervently opposes a conception of the self as sundered from its world.
The only way existence can be understood is to let it be; to comprehend that existence is not defined by a soul or essence, but to see that existence only is by its relationality to and in the world.
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All existentials “belong” to Dasein in that they constitute part of its structure of care, but
alētheia (“unconcealment”) is what lets Dasein know and interpret the world. Everyday practical
objects, such as the torque wrench and hammer, reveal themselves through unconcealment as tools
to be concerned about and used in a particular way. The being of these tools consists in their whatfor, what they are handy for. Signs, as well, possess the character of handiness and are distinguished
from one another by the specific referential situatedness that is their what-for. A stop sign “tells”
Dasein something quite unlike a “construction ahead” sign.
These objects and signs, in turn, allow Dasein a glimpse of others that inhabit its Mitwelt,
or with-world. Dasein meets “…them ‘at work,’ that is, primarily in their being-in-the-world (Being and Time 117). Individual Dasein distinguishes itself from these others by its own being-in-theworld. But individual Dasein falls prey to the proclamations and whisperings of the they in its
everyday existence, and so becomes the they-self. Authentic Dasein disperses itself when it obeys
the commands of the they. Nonetheless, this does not mean that all instances of being-with-oneanother entail a manifestation of the they. As recounted above, caring-for-one-another can take on
authentic or inauthentic forms, through the existential of solicitude. The authentic variant respects
the autonomy of the possibilities and care of individual Dasein, but its counterpart does not – it
suffocates it.
We have now come to the terminus of our discussion of Being and Time – but there is so
much more to be said about Heidegger yet.

25

Fig. 4: Vincent Van Gogh – Shoes – 1886
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§7. “The Origin of the Work of Art”
I should confess at this point that my predilection for using artworks as explanatory tools
for philosophical concepts is, sadly, not very original – Heidegger beat me to this 85 years ago
with his presentation of “The Origin of the Work of Art.” The lecture can be thought of, to a certain
point, as an expansion on the concepts of Zuhandenheit and alētheia. But it is especially notable
(and significant for us as Heideggerian Marxists) due to Heidegger’s novel examination of Van
Gogh’s painting Shoes as an existential-phenomenological “nexus” of sorts. The relevance of this
will be made evident later on, in chapter two of this thesis. A disclaimer: we will not throw ourselves as unreservedly into “The Origin of the Work of Art” as we did Being and Time; some
concepts are shared between the two texts, and there is only so much one can write before a thesis
becomes a dissertation.
Structurally, Heidegger employs a similar method in “Origin” as in Being and Time. As the
history of Being has been gradually forgotten by the canon of Western philosophy, so, too, has the
essence of the artwork. The Ancient Romans, as the successors to the Greeks, committed the first
transgression, and so cast the West into “rootlessness” (“The Origin of the Work of Art” 149). This
historical tendency has ultimately led us to cover over things in their thingliness, or to forget their
character of thingliness altogether. The work of art is thus simultaneously thingly and artistic, producing a very special sort of phenomenological crossroads. As he says,
But even the much-vaunted aesthetic experience cannot get around the thingly aspect of
the artwork. There is something stony in a work of architecture, wooden in a carving, colored in a painting, spoken in a linguistic work, sonorous in a musical composition. The
thingly element is so irremovably present in the artwork that we are compelled rather to
say conversely that the architectural work is in stone, the carving is in wood, the painting
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in color, the linguistic work in speech, the musical composition in sound…But what is this
self-evident thingly element in the work of art? (145)
The thingliness of the artwork is always present, but the arthood of the artwork cannot be collapsed
into the thingliness either. It continuously “…makes public something other than itself; it manifests
something other; it is an allegory” (145). In other words, an artwork is not appropriated solely as
either an artwork or a simple smattering-together of colors on a canvas. It contains a certain hermeneutic manifold within it that only is as such because of the interplay between thingliness and
arthood.
What must be investigated now, then, is how the thingliness and arthood of an artwork
reveal themselves to Dasein. The following quote from Heidegger, albeit lengthy, is worth reproducing in its entirety, as it essentially contains the very heart of what will become crucial for us:
From the dark opening of the worn insides of the shoes the toilsome tread of the worker
stares forth. In the stiffly rugged heaviness of the shoes there is the accumulated tenacity of
her slow trudge through the far-spreading field and ever-uniform furrows of the field swept
by a raw wind. On the leather lie the dampness and richness of the soil. Under the soles
stretches the loneliness of the field-path as evening falls. In the shoes vibrates the silent call
of the earth, its quiet gift of the ripening grain and its unexplained self-refusal in the fallow
desolation of the wintry field. This equipment is pervaded by uncomplaining worry as to
the certainty of bread, the wordless joy of having once more withstood want, the trembling
before the impending childbed and shivering at the surrounding menace of death. This
equipment belongs to the earth, and it is protected in the world of the peasant woman. (161)
As analogues to thingliness and arthood, earth and world thus constitute, when taken together, a
constant tension that at times leans one way, and at another, in the other. Here world can be
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understood in the same manner in which we interpreted it in Being and Time – Dasein’s world
shines through its care for it. The “world” of the peasant woman is revealed through the tools that
are part of her concern, or circumspect heedfulness, with the world (much as it was for the subsistence farmer). She keeps her shoes nearby – they matter to her.
The notion of the “earth” is a bit harder to resolve. Speaking very, very approximately, it
can be typified as those sorts of things that do not easily lend themselves to Dasein’s attempts to
comprehend them. As Heidegger mentions, color:
…shines and wants only to shine. When we analyze it in rational terms by measuring its
wavelength, it is gone. It shows itself only when it remains undisclosed and unexplained.
Earth thus shatters every attempt to penetrate it. It causes every merely calculating importunity upon it to turn into a destruction. (172)
Color is simply, when appropriated phenomenologically by Dasein, color. When Dasein employs
the mode of taking-care that presents color to it as wavelength, hue, shade, etc., color “in itself”
disappears from view. These physical properties constitute a technical understanding of color, but
they are not color itself. The primal, phenomenal experience of color is shoved aside in favor of
this. To tie this matter a little more explicitly to Shoes, Heidegger explicitly categorizes the shoes
as belonging to the earth. But here is where the tension between world and earth emerges – the
shoes, understood as shoes, can only be grasped by Dasein if they are located within the equipmental, concernful world: “Only here [in the field] are they what they are” (159). Yet the only way
that we could approximate any explanation of the shoes’ “being-in-the-earth,” to coin a rather
crude term, is to shatter our phenomenological experience of it into a dry recounting of physical
facts. Any attempt to know the shoes explicitly buries them, a little further each time. Shoes are
not merely leather nor laces – they are much more than that. The thing (and by extension, the
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artwork) cannot be taken as a discrete object for abstract, metaphysical, or scientific analysis if the
goal is to understand it as it is. Rather, it must be given the opportunity to be in its very thingliness
or arthood, in the world or earth. An artwork is not merely a confluence of oils or a canvas within
a frame, nor is a hammer merely a union between wood and iron. The relationality of Dasein to its
world, as expressed through its totality of involvements, has bearing still.
The locked horns of the earth and world are what makes artwork so revolutionary for
Heidegger (and so momentous for us). The artwork is precisely the most transparent “host” to the
struggle between the earth and world because it does not open itself up to the world as tools do.
Dasein cannot concern itself with the Zuhandenheit of an artwork because it does not possess the
character of Zuhandenheit. It cannot take-care-of it with its own hands. When faced with a work
of art, Dasein has no choice but to stand back and be immersed – in all its interplay within and of
the earth and world. And this dynamicity is not, following so much else in Heidegger, some metaphysical pairing that is aimlessly floating out in Platonic space, ready to be exhumed by the rational
consciousness. Instead:
The world is the self-opening openness of the broad paths of the simple and essential decisions in the destiny of a historical people. The earth is the spontaneous forthcoming of that
which is continually self-secluding and to that extent sheltering and concealing. World and
earth are essentially different from one another and yet are never separated. The world
grounds itself on the earth, and earth juts through world. (174)
Our interpretation of Heidegger has hitherto not engaged with the historical, but we are now
brought before this concept of the “destiny of a historical people.” The effect of the historical on
Dasein is indispensable for our creation of a Heideggerian Marxism, and so we would be fools to
leave it unexamined.
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Following his words on Shoes, Heidegger brings his view to a simple Greek temple, standing “…in the middle of the rock-cleft valley” (167). For the sake of explanation, let us assume that
this temple is very stereotypically Greek. If we enter and stand in the center of its interior, we are
surrounded on all sides by a series of colonnades. The pillars themselves are of the Doric variant,
the earliest of the Greek architectural orders. The floor is a mosaic of brilliant white marble. Directly opposite us, at the far end of the temple, is an enormous statue of a god. Let us refrain from
saying which god of the Greeks it is. All we are aware of is that it is present – but not in the sense
that it literally and physically descended from Mount Olympus and stood with us. The god is “present,” but remains unseen. It is “present” in that it lives in its significance to the historical Dasein
of the Greeks. As the home of the god, the temple:
…first fits together and at the same time gathers around itself the unity of those paths and
relations in which birth and death, disaster and blessing, victory and disgrace, endurance
and decline acquire the shape of destiny for human being. The all-governing expanse of
this open relational context is the world of this historical people. (167)
To stay within the analogy a bit longer: if the people of the culture who once built the temple were
the Spartans, perhaps the famous warriors ritually prepared themselves for battle under the stern
countenance of Ares. If, instead, the temple was consecrated in the name of Vesta, the Roman
goddess of the family, it would have been populated by a group of vestal virgins, tending to the
fire of the sacred hearth. Further still, if the temple served to venerate Kukulkan, the feathered
serpent of the Mayan pantheon, it may have bore witness to the arrival of many human sacrifices
to Xibalba, the underworld.
In our initial discussion of Being and Time, we spent some time on the existential of
alētheia – Dasein’s method of apprehending truth. Recall that alētheia is not synonymous with
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truth; it is the phenomenological ground through which truth shines. In order to discover the truth
of beings as the beings they are, we must first be phenomenologically receptive to them. We must
recognize them as situated within a referential network, as the torque wrench revealed its being as
a tool with the bolt and the motorcycle all those pages ago. In doing this, we are within alētheia –
and also within the temple and the artwork. Heidegger writes,
Truth happens in the temple’s standing where it is. This does not mean that something is
correctly represented and rendered here, but that beings as a whole are brought into unconcealment [alētheia] and held therein…Truth happens in Van Gogh’s painting. This does not
mean that something at hand is correctly portrayed, but rather that in the revelation of the
equipmental being of the shoes beings as a whole – world and earth in their counterplay –
attain to unconcealment. (181)
The work of art, then, as temple, sculpture, painting, or whatever else, makes apparent the relation
of the earth and world for historical Dasein. Through the artwork, we are told what matters to
historical Dasein. As the peasant kept her shoes close by, so does a historical people leave theirs
by the door to their temple.

32

Fig. 5: Shadow of Kukulkan descending the steps at Chichen Itzá, Mexico, 2009
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§8. “Letter on Humanism”
As should be evident by now, Heidegger has a habit of asking his colleagues, living or
dead, to reexamine their “foundational” assumptions. It is not that what they have thought and
written is necessarily wrong – it is that they have not thought deeply enough. The “Letter” is likely
one of the clearest manifestations of this habit of Heidegger’s. Though some of it contains
Heidegger’s most fecund words on Marx, it was really written in response to Jean-Paul Sartre. In
1946, Sartre had just introduced the French academy to his “Existentialism is a Humanism,” a short
lecture that laid out the central principles of his take on being, nothingness, and freedom. Part of
it reads:
…there is at least one being whose existence comes before its essence, a being which exists
before it can be defined by any conception of it. That being is man, or as Heidegger has it,
the human reality. What do we mean by saying that existence precedes essence? We mean
that man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world – and defines himself
afterwards…there is no human nature, because there is no God to have a conception of it.
Man simply is. Not that he is simply what he conceives himself to be, but he is what he
wills, and as he conceives himself after already existing – as he wills to be after that leap
towards existence. Man is nothing else but that which he makes of himself. (“Existentialism is a Humanism” 349)
So is the famous existentialist motto born: “Existence precedes essence.” At the center of humanity, in Sartre’s view, there is a condemnation to be free – because there is no essence, divine or
otherwise, to guide us, we are solely responsible for the choices that we make. These choices are
precisely how we make ourselves into humans. Existentialism consequently becomes our path to
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attaining authentic freedom as human beings. It is only through the courageous acceptance of the
“essencelessness” of existence that existentialism becomes a humanism.
At first glance, Sartre’s words appear vaguely Heideggerian. If our acquaintance with
Heidegger was somewhat cursory and undeveloped, we could not blame ourselves for thinking as
much. But Sartre’s assertion that existence precedes essence relies on a much older philosophical
thesis – one that Heidegger expressed fervent disapproval for in Being and Time. Once more, from
Sartre:
And at the point of departure there cannot be any other truth than this, I think, therefore I
am, which is the absolute truth of consciousness as it attains to itself. Every theory which
begins with man, outside of this moment of self-attainment, is a theory which thereby suppresses the truth, for outside of the Cartesian cogito, all objects are no more than probable,
and any doctrine of probabilities which is not attached to a truth will crumble into nothing…this theory alone is compatible with the dignity of man, it is the only one which does
not make man into an object. (361)
It is true that the “Letter on Humanism” was written as a response on Heidegger’s part to Sartre –
but with a little effort, we can see how Heidegger distinguishes his own phenomenological-existential ontology from Sartre’s Cartesian existentialism. The two are irreconcilably incompatible,
and not nearly as related as we might believe. In Being and Time, Heidegger dismissed the Cartesian schism between the subject and its world as fundamentally opposed to the always-alreadyinvolvedness of Dasein: “It is not the case that human being ‘is,’ and then on top of that has a
relation of being to the ‘world’ which it sometimes takes upon itself” (Being and Time 57).
Through this antagonism, the concrete goal of the “Letter on Humanism” rises: a humanism
that is conscious of its own Being as Dasein must be rediscovered, and not buried once more
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through a false pretension at freedom. When it comes to humanism, the metaphysicians, from
Descartes to Sartre, have not thought deeply enough. The sundry explanations they have offered
up – animalitas, zōon logon echon, cogito – none reach the truth of Being, preferring to substitute
it for their own postulations: “Every determination of the essence of man that already presupposes
an interpretation of beings without asking about the truth of Being, whether knowingly or not, is
metaphysical” (“Letter on Humanism” 226). Their accounts all rely on the stagnant bifurcation
between “existence” and “essence,” in which the latter is arbitrarily assigned at some other point
to the former. For them, man is something else. On the other hand, for Heidegger, Dasein is.
The dualism of existence and essence conceals Dasein’s Being from itself. We dealt with
an analogous phenomenon over 20 pages ago with the cases of the biologist, sociologist, and psychoanalyst. But where they covered over the being of objects through the carrying-out of their
analytical projects, what is noteworthy about the “Letter” is that it turns to language, as both obscurer and illuminator of Being itself.
Though the obscuring of Being by dint of language occurs virtually every day and multiple
times a day, let us invoke a more “visible” instance of it: President Ronald Reagan’s 1982 speech
to the British Parliament, Thatcherite at the time. More than halfway through, he proclaims:
In an ironic sense Karl Marx was right. We are witnessing today a great revolutionary crisis,
a crisis where the demands of the economic order are conflicting directly with those of the
political order. But the crisis is happening not in the free, non-Marxist West, but in the
home of Marxist-Leninism, the Soviet Union. It is the Soviet Union that runs against the
tide of history by denying human freedom and human dignity to its citizens. (Reagan)
The simplest and most obvious implication of Reagan’s propagandizing is that the capitalist West
is the only civilization that does respect the freedom and dignity of humanity; it is the only union
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that has obeyed history. That communicating this was likely Reagan’s intention should not come
as a surprise to anyone even casually familiar with the history of the Cold War.
But this is secondary to the metaphysical leadenness of Reagan’s words. The speech depends on a certain metaphysical belief: that humanity has a nature, and that this nature is best
respected by capitalism. Because – and here I speak with plainly Marxist bias – humanity is intrinsically selfish and exploitative, so the oft-heard argument goes, the system that rules it must reward
selfishness and exploitation. Forgotten are all the real, material conditions that contributed to the
Soviet Union’s onerous position in 1982, to say nothing of its fall nearly ten years later. With the
postulation of a fixed human nature that is in “harmony” with the forces of capital, the “failure” of
Soviet-Marxist communism is postulated as the consequence of being against nature itself.
Intertwined with this is the American fondness for natural rights theory, concretized in the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. According to this political-metaphysical tradition, each individual human has a set of inviolable natural rights that are granted to him or her by a Creator, and
any and all governments must be checked from time to time so that their respect of these rights is
assured. Presumably, Reagan’s promulgations of “human freedom and human dignity” are derived
from said tradition, which reaches deep into the metaphysical thought of the Enlightenment. But
if we critique said tradition more carefully – if we begin to think more deeply, as Heidegger would
have us do – Reagan’s words dissolve into air. “Freedom,” “dignity,” and even “human nature” are
loaded words. They belie a very particular and limited image of human beings, in which the Being
of Dasein is hidden away and exchanged for the “rational” and “autonomous” subject with inviolable rights (or, for short, the “liberal subject”). This sort of metaphysical backing is the only thing
that permits such things as the myth of “pulling oneself up by their bootstraps” to arise. It is also
the only thing that can inspire Sartre’s Cartesian existentialism.

37

But the more salient point is that Reagan uses language to apprehend humanity in this
restricted, inauthentic way, as the liberal subject. For him and the metaphysicians that made his
speech possible, “there is” an essence that determines the Being of humanity. But what we, as
Heideggerian Marxists, are concerned with is the phrase “It gives.”
We are preoccupied with the “It gives” due to a particularly cryptic (but paradoxically most
enlightening) statement of Heidegger’s: “Language is the house of Being” (“Letter on Humanism”
217). Language is what allows Dasein to “stand out” within the clearing of Being, within what we
have referred to so often as alētheia: “Language is the clearing-concealing advent of Being itself”
(230). Being, as delineated and given to Dasein by language, is itself socially, culturally, and temporally conditioned. By “temporally,” I mean something very similar to “historically,” but with
the added note that this temporality belongs to Dasein. Dasein is in time, and not in the same way
a clock tells time; coldly, separately. Dasein only is as such due to time, its thrownness from the
past, projection into the future, and recognition of it via our present use of language:
Man is rather ‘thrown’ from Being itself into the truth of Being, so that ek-sisting in this
fashion he might guard the truth of Being, in order that beings might appear in the light of
Being as the beings they are. Man does not decide whether and how beings appear, whether
and how God and the gods or history and nature come forward into the clearing of Being,
come to presence and depart. The advent of Beings lies in the destiny of Being. (234)
And this historic quality of Being is shared, amongst a certain people and within a certain historical moment. Through their communication with one another, they enter into discourse, the specific existential of Dasein that gives language its power of illumination:
Discoursing is the ‘significant’ structuring [Gliedern] of intelligibility of being-in-theworld, to which being-with belongs, and which maintains itself in a particular way of
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heedful being-with-one-another. Being-with-one-another talks in assenting, refusing, inviting, ceding, furthermore as ‘making statements’ and as talking in ‘giving a talk…’ Discourse necessarily has this structural factor because it also constitutes the disclosedness of
being-in-the-world and is prestructured in its own structure by this fundamental constitution of Dasein. What is talked about in discourse is always ‘addressed’ in a particular view
and within certain limits. In all discourse there is what is spoken as such, what is said as
such when one actually wishes, asks, talks things over…In this ‘something said,’ discourse
communicates. (Being and Time 156)
Dasein agrees to abide by these “certain limits” whenever it participates in discourse. At every
stage of history, there is a certain boundary that determines what is intelligible; it structures what
is able to be said and how it is said. This boundary morphs from moment to moment and from
people to people. The historically-inherited Being of a people, as Dasein, is thus found in language.
It was also present in the artwork and temple from “The Origin of the Work of Art.” Dasein,
through the temporally sensitive expression of language, comes into the light of Being. Dasein
comprehends itself and its historical givenness by giving itself back to itself through language. It
is as if Dasein, through the use of language, places a mirror in front of itself. Behind it stand all its
situatedness in history, sociality, culture, and materiality. This is still a deeply complicated phenomenon, but Heidegger’s words may permit us some respite:
‘German’ is not spoken to the world so that the world might be reformed through the German essence; rather, it is spoken to the Germans so that from a fateful belongingness to the
nations they might become world-historical along with them. The homeland of this historical dwelling is nearness to Being. (“Letter on Humanism” 241-242)
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What the peoples of the world must do, then, is reclaim themselves. The natural question is why
they have not yet done so. To this we reply: because these peoples have had their Being liquidated,
and have it liquidated each day. They have lost it to the empty words of the they, as the ideals of
freedom and dignity were lost to the vacuous impositions of Reagan’s speech. It is thus the task of
Dasein to continually restore its authentic potentiality-of-being-a-self from the inauthentic oblivion it has been consigned to by Das Man.
So, if we are to create a truly humanistic humanism, the essential alienation of Dasein must
be recognized. For Heidegger, there is only one “metaphysician” who realized this: Karl Marx. In
regard:
Homelessness is coming to be the destiny of the world. Hence it is necessary to think that
destiny in terms of the history of Being. What Marx recognized in an essential and significant sense, though derived from Hegel, as the estrangement of man has its roots in the
homelessness of modern man. This homelessness is specifically evoked from the destiny
of Being in the form of metaphysics, and through metaphysics is simultaneously entrenched and covered up as such. Because Marx by experiencing estrangement attains an
essential dimension of history, the Marxist view of history is superior to that of other historical accounts. But since neither [Edmund] Husserl nor – so far as I have seen till now –
Sartre recognizes the essential importance of the historical in Being, neither phenomenology nor existentialism enters that dimension within which a productive dialogue with
Marxism first becomes possible. (243)
In order to better comprehend what Heidegger intends here with “homelessness,” let us hear the
voice of the they in all its sonorousness and persistence. How Dasein loses itself to the they must
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be seen, shifting and evolving. With a little more hard work, too, we might be able to begin this
productive dialogue.
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Fig. 6: Still from John Carpenter’s They Live (1988)
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§9. “The Question Concerning Technology”
Despite their being each other’s most significant political enemy, fascists and Marxist communists are united by a common theme: the contention that capitalism has dissolved all hithertoexisting social relations in all its manifestations. What distinguishes the fascist from the Marxist
is what he proposes as a solution. No matter the variant of fascism he subscribes to, always, he
longs for a return to a mythologized past – a reassertion of social hierarchies, of national identity.
Man over woman, white over black, wealthy over destitute. Volk over Fremdvölk. These are the
eternal and natural distinctions that have allowed humanity to become what it has, or so the fascist
argues. The Marxist instead looks to the future, to the possibility of a classless society, to the freedom of a world-community whose relations do not revolve around the homelessness and emptiness
of exchange and consumption. From his (and my) perspective, the social strata that the fascist
cherishes so enthusiastically have, in their wake, left unprecedented amounts of suffering and repression. In truth, they continue to – and so they should be the last thing we ever return to. And to
settle for the present state of things when a better world is possible is to admit that such suffering
is morally permissible.
“The Question Concerning Technology” is Heidegger’s own attempt at explaining this phenomenon of the dissolution of all sociality. He does not fault capitalism outright – if he did, the
possibility of a Heideggerian Marxism would be much more obvious and this thesis would have
little purpose. Rather, what has shrouded over Being in the modern age for Heidegger is technology, understood phenomenologically.
We must remember – for Heidegger, the essence of truth consists in Dasein’s ability to
perceive things as the things that they are. The rook, the motorcycle, the wrench; all of these are
given their essences by the phenomenological appropriation of Dasein. They are understood as
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part of a referential network, which changes according to the mode of unconcealment Dasein is
choosing to take for itself. We have made this point multiple times by highlighting how the same
object can be phenomenologically apprehended as really a manifold of interpretations: a human
being becomes the liberal subject or the center of unconscious drives, a bobby pin becomes a
lockpick or a bookmark, etc. We do not need to make it again. What is now both our concern and
Heidegger’s is what the phenomenological essence of technology is; to be more exact, how it
functions as a mode of unconcealment. It will be best comprehended if we first set up its negative,
as a sort of “pure” unconcealment that we may compare it to later.
At the start of every project there is a cause – really four causes, in Heidegger’s view. They
can be seen in the mode of production that an artisan engages in when he chooses to create something new and sets off to work upon it. In doing so, he gathers them:
For centuries philosophy has taught that there are four causes: (1) the causa materialis, the
material, the matter out of which, for example, a silver chalice is made; (2) the causa formalis, the form, the shape into which the material enters; (3) the causa finalis, the end, for
example, the sacrificial rite in relation to which the required chalice is determined as to its
form and matter; (4) the causa efficiens, which brings about the effect that is the finished,
actual chalice, the silversmith. (“The Question Concerning Technology” 313-314)
The chalice, as the product of these four causes, is indebted to them. They outline its referential
network, so to speak. The silver is that which gives the chalice its color, luster, pliability, etc. A
chalice surely is able to be interpreted as a chalice by virtue of its shape; it would make little sense
to make a ring of silver and call it a chalice. The causa finalis is the reason why it is being made.
It indicates its significance for Dasein. The silversmith is the causa efficiens, but not in the way
we would normally think. By virtue of his hands and eyes the chalice does come into physical
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existence, but the phenomenological weight of such a creation is not in this newfound physicality.
Rather, “The three previously mentioned ways of being responsible owe thanks to the pondering
of the silversmith for the ‘that’ and the ‘how’ of their coming into appearance and into play for the
production of the sacrificial vessel” (316). The ‘that’ and ‘how,’ as we have explicated from “The
Origin of the Work of Art” and the “Letter on Humanism,” are socially, historically, culturally, and
materially determined. As Dasein, the silversmith “imparts” the temporality and specificity of his
own Being into what he creates.
The four causes exemplify the phenomenological phenomena of physis and poiēsis, or
“bringing-forth” (317). These two are unlike each other in that poiēsis is contingent on another
actualizing its coming-to-presence, e.g., the silversmith for the chalice. Physis, on the other hand,
is what presences from itself – for instance, the birth of a butterfly from the chrysalis of a caterpillar. According to my reading, I would venture to say that both physis and poiēsis – but especially
the latter – are a “practical” acting-out of alētheia. To quote Heidegger:
Bringing-forth brings out of concealment into unconcealment. Bringing-forth propriates
only insofar as something concealed comes into unconcealment. This coming rests and
moves freely within what we call revealing [das Entbergen]. The Greeks have the word
alētheia for revealing. The Romans translate this with veritas. We say ‘truth’… (317-318)
Bringing-forth, as the practical manifestation of alētheia, is thus the phenomenological basis for
production. But as there are starkly different modes of production – the tribal, ancient, feudal, and
capitalist modes, to use Marx’s theory of history – there is also a multitude of modes of unconcealment. To speak in a slightly Heideggerian Marxist way, because production has been almost
completely technologized and mechanized through capital, it has lost its character of authentic
bringing-forth. Gone are the days in which the simple laborer would look to satisfy his own needs
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or those of the community around him. Capital, as perhaps the most globalizing force the world
has ever come across, has overwhelmed the laborer – and labor must always endeavor tirelessly to
appease what its exploiters demand of it. Consequently, technological modernity has, in its repeated revolutionizing of itself, become its own mode of unconcealment: “Technology is a mode
of revealing. Technology comes to presence in the realm where revealing and unconcealment take
place, where alētheia, truth, happens” (319).
It is through alētheia that the phenomenology of capitalism brings itself into view for the
first time. Production under technologized and industrialized capital has lost its character of bringing-forth, to the point of alienating the producer from the very process of production itself. What
must now be extolled, then, is how capitalist production accomplishes this trampling-over of
poiēsis and physis. As its own ground of unconcealment, technological modernity is much more
aggressive in its relating to unformed masses; it is not a bringing-forth, but a challenging-forth,
for the sake of storing the energies found therein for later use. Heidegger provides us with the case
of the river Rhine:
The hydroelectric plant is set into the current of the Rhine. It sets the Rhine to supplying
its hydraulic pressure, which then sets the turbines turning. This turning sets those machines in motion whose thrust sets going the electric current for which the long-distance
power station and its network of cables are set up to dispatch electricity. In the context of
the interlocking processes pertaining to the orderly disposition of electrical energy, even
the Rhine itself appears to be something at our command. The hydroelectric plant is not
built into the Rhine River as was the old wooden bridge that joined bank with bank for
hundreds of years. Rather, the river is dammed up into the power plant. What the river is
now, namely, a water-power supplier, derives from the essence of the power station. (321)
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Because of technological modernization, the river is no longer permitted to be a river. It is instead
challenged-forth and set-upon, leading to its distortion into a fuel source. It is robbed of its physis
and turned into something else altogether: Bestand, or standing-reserve.
The organization of the earth into standing-reserve is arranged under the familiar commanding principle of “maximum yield at minimum expense” (321). The similarities to the capitalist
mode of production are becoming evident at this point – but, to drive the point home further, it is
not solely the earth that falls victim to the inauthentic mode of unconcealment endemic to capitalist
modernity. We ourselves, as Dasein, are subject to it as well:
The forester who measures the felled timber in the woods and who to all appearances walks
the forest path in the same way his grandfather did is today ordered by the industry that
produces commercial woods, whether he knows it or not. He is made subordinate to the
orderability of cellulose, which for its part is challenged forth by the need for paper, which
is then delivered to newspapers and illustrated magazines. The latter, in their turn, set public
opinion to swallowing what is printed, so that a set configuration of opinion becomes available on demand. (323)
The forester of the modern age has fallen prey to modernity, through the material basis of capitalist
production and the ideological reinforcement of the inauthentic words of the they. But he is not
standing-reserve either – he is its actuator, its executor. It is only through Dasein that alētheia can
collapse into the mode of unconcealment for capitalist modernity that finally finds its name: enframing.
Enframing stands contrary to poiēsis and physis. Where they let things be, enframing takes
them for itself and does with them what it will. It is through enframing that the oceans of the earth
become little more than oil wells; that all the laborers that accompany the capitalist as inhabitants
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of the earth become exploitable sources of wealth; that Dasein – at least within the context of “The
Question Concerning Technology” – loses itself to Das Man, the they. The they is the whispering
ghost that sounds out the ideological justification of the present state of affairs. It is what, innocently and sweetly, voices: “This is the way things are, always have been, and always will be.” To
make the first thoroughly Heideggerian Marxist statement of this thesis: the they is the unthought
whisper that, with a rueful face but a hidden grin, tells us that capitalism has always ruled humanity
– and always will. Under the dictatorship of the they, “Everyone is the other, and no one is himself”
(Being and Time 124). To this I would add: “Neither under capitalism.”
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Fig. 7: Monument to Karl Marx – Chemnitz, Germany
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Chapter 2 – Marx & Being-in-Capital
§10. Marx – Preparation
We have produced from our analyses of “The Origin of the Work of Art” and “The Question
Concerning Technology” two fundamental points: firstly, that our phenomenological modes of being-in-the-world are historically determined; secondly, that these modes are responsive to material
entities and processes, such as technology. The existential categories that we discussed as part of
Being and Time are therefore not the “content” of being-in-the-world but rather the “forms” which
hold the specific, concrete expressions of Being at a given historical moment. The question that
now arises is how these forms are influenced – or curtailed – by capitalism (and by history as a
whole). Given that Being is historically and materially delineated, and that these delineations are
brought to light via concrete phenomenological activity, it follows that the interpretive and productive possibilities of Being are at least partially determined by the directives according to which
our concrete phenomenological activity is organized. In other words, what we do and what we say
are shaped, in some manner, by the material mode of production – in our case, capitalism. This is
one of the central assumptions that underlies the very possibility of a Heideggerian Marxism, and
one that we would do well to keep in mind as we progress through the following pages.
A few words should be said before entering into the analysis proper. While my interpretation of Heidegger has been relatively orthodox so far, I do not intend to give Marx the same treatment. The “mechanical” element of his critique of capitalism is more or less preserved in its original form, as is his theory of history, but one of my two goals in this second chapter is to remedy
what I have said I see as a glaring flaw in Marx: his description and conception of alienation as it
arises in the labor process. I am simply not convinced by “species-being” or anything resembling
it, at least as a persuasive theory of subjectivity. In addition, I should mention that I am not
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understanding capitalism as solely a material mode of production. This is a common view in Marxist scholarship and critical theory, but it is worth repeating nonetheless for the purpose of clarification. Following the neo-Marxists, I take as a basic assumption that the process of alienation does
not end concurrently with the working day. It is instead reproduced by a great social and cultural
totality that, in reproducing itself, remakes capital and its ideological justifications as well. Toward
this end, we state our work for this second chapter: because the overarching object of this thesis is
to produce a basis for both Heideggerian Marxism and a phenomenology of capitalism, we must
say, at last, what constitutes being-in-capital.
We will proceed along the following path: Capital, Volume One, as Marx’s own submission
to the canon of the great philosophical works of history, will occupy us first. Much like Being and
Time, however, it is a weighty and overwhelming tome. Out of a sense of practicality, then, we will
limit our engagement with it to the famous fragment on the fetishism of commodities. Marx’s idea
that each commodity contains a whole network of social relations, while only being grasped as a
simple object, is the last philosophical thesis we must investigate before we are ready to describe
being-in-capital in full. This task of description is what we will do next, after a summarizing of the
major points that have filled this thesis thus far. Though I am hesitant to reveal prematurely exactly
what being-in-capital consists of in these paragraphs, suffice it to say that its essential elements
consist in, in addition to Marx’s fetishism of commodities, the four causes and interplay between
earth and world that Heidegger detailed in “The Question Concerning Technology” and “The
Origin of the Work of Art.” Walter Benjamin, whom I have already mentioned once in this thesis,
will do us the favor of bringing everything to fruition by providing the final link.
Once this theoretical exegesis of being-in-capital is completed, we turn to the second of
Marx’s works, “The German Ideology.” Engaging at length with it will sensitize us to the fact that
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being-in-capital, like its host system, has gestated in and throughout history. The genesis of beingin-capital is dependent on the degree of advancement of productive technology; therefore, to best
comprehend it, we must investigate how such productive technology has progressed through each
revolution and intensification of the means, forces, and relations of production. Moreover, “The
German Ideology” will alert us to the possibility that the phenomenological and material have
always coexisted in and through one another, thereby providing support for Heidegger’s “productive dialogue” with Marx (“Letter on Humanism” 243). This being said, we cannot hope to create
a comprehensive account of the entire phenomenological history of Dasein – such a task would be
difficult and lengthy for even the most accomplished and diligent philosophers, and could likely
fill an entire book, if not several.
Marx’s “Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844” will be the third – and for this
chapter, final – object of our attention. In treating them, our creation of a Heideggerian Marxism
will begin to take flight, so to speak. We will tread once more through the five sources of intelligibility that we articulated in the first chapter – the tool, the sign, Das Man, the artwork, and
language – that we surveyed through Heidegger, but we will now examine them as they appear,
reconstituted, in capitalism. Finally, once we are finished with these three elements of Marxist
thought, we will be fully equipped to examine the phenomenology of capitalism as it has manifested itself in that city that we know for all the wrong reasons: Detroit, Michigan.
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Fig. 8: Pepsi – 2021
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§11. The Fetishism of Pepsi and the Secret Thereof
Contemporary life seems to be full of such oddities that it seems almost as if they were
planted there as some sort of joke. Capitalist corporations routinely display astounding levels of
ignorance and cynicism in their efforts to increase their profits, so there are many instances one
could take as encapsulating commodity fetishism. In truth, this fetishism surrounds us in everyday
life. But, at least in recent memory, hardly any other case drew such attention than the advertisement aired by PepsiCo, Pepsi soda’s parent company, some four years ago. The ad itself is so
brazen in its lack of awareness that it has become somewhat of an easy target for anti-capitalist
critiques, but it is precisely because of this that it is worth investigating.
The cursory plotline of the ad revolves around three perspectives: a Muslim woman, poring
over dozens of photographs strewn over a table; an East Asian man, inexplicably playing a cello
on a rooftop; and lastly, the American celebrity Kendall Jenner posing for a photo session alongside
a busy street. The street itself is not populated by cars, as it would be otherwise, but by a great
procession of protesters carrying signs that, for the most part, remain illegible. The few messages
that can be read are predictably purged of any truly revolutionary content and reduced to hazy
appeals to a concept of social justice that is equally hazy.
As the protesters make their way down the street, Jenner takes notice of them and joins in.
Interspersed throughout are a series of jump cuts that nearly always emphasize two elements: the
happiness of the protesters, and the ubiquity of Pepsi. Jenner is immediately handed a can of the
drink upon joining the movement, and, after presumably spending some time with them, she comes
to the head of the mass. Facing them are a line of policemen whose purpose is to either redirect
the protesters’ path or contain them outright. Then, Jenner approaches one of the police, so dutifully keeping the peace, and offers him a drink of Pepsi. The protesters cheer and laugh and smile
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in response, and the police officer, now refreshed by the cool, sweet taste of Pepsi, looks to one of
his fellow officers and purses his lips in a half-smile, as if to say, “Don’t you think they might have
a point?”
The ad was pulled from public exposure very quickly, following a (thoroughly deserved)
negative reaction. But what remains philosophically interesting for us is the ad’s positioning of
Pepsi, the product, as the panacea through which racism and police brutality – and presumably all
social ills – have been magically solved. No longer is there a need for nightsticks, riot shields, and
police dogs: we have Pepsi now. It is essentially part and parcel of marketing tactics to attempt to
persuade the potential consumer to associate some desirable quality (e.g., virility, happiness,
youth) with the product being advertised, so the positioning itself is nothing new. But what do we
call this identification between the actual, physical commodity being sold, and the qualities it purports to give us? We look to Marx for a response:
There is a definite social relation between men, that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic
form of a relation between things. In order, therefore, to find an analogy, we must have
recourse to the mist-enveloped regions of the religious world. In that world the productions
of the human brain appear as independent beings endowed with life, and entering into relation both with one another and the human race. So it is in the world of commodities with
the products of men’s hands. This I call the Fetishism which attaches itself to the product
of labour, so soon as they are produced as commodities, and which is therefore inseparable
from the production of commodities. (Capital, Volume One 321)
What Marx speaks of is certainly not difficult to see. If one has been raised in a religious environment, whether in a church, synagogue, mosque, or temple, some object has been fetishized. As a
fetish, the object is endowed with certain powers, transcends its physical limits, and most
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importantly, brings its deity to presence. In Christianity, the crucifix summons the presence of
Christ; during Mass, the bread and wine come to be His body and blood; the baptismal font washes
away the stain of original sin, invisible as it may be. Therefore, a fetish represents a concretization
of something ethereal, or transcendental, in the particular, contingent, empirical world of humankind. But the commodity is not immediately a fetish. It is instead made such by virtue of its being
exchanged, its exchange-value. For Marx, all objects contain this and a use-value. The function of
either is more or less apparent from their names, but in order to make full use of both them and
this advertisement that so very obviously displays the fetishism of commodities, we will continue
with it.
For the sake of explanation, let us suppose that Pepsi is our absolute favorite drink, and
that we are entirely enraptured by the willingness of PepsiCo to support the recent protests against
police brutality. The ad has achieved what it was designed to do in our case. Pepsi, as a drink,
contains a use-value for us. Surely it is not the kind of drink we would reach for if we were severely
dehydrated, but, nevertheless, its sugar, calories, and status as a consumable liquid do provide us
with some of the energy that we require to subsist. It fulfills the same role as any other type of
food. But we now venture to the nearest supermarket and buy a few more boxes than we normally
would, bursting with eagerness to display our support as well. We gloss over the fact that a few
hundred exploited workers were involved in every moment of production that culminated in our
purchasing the Pepsi from the supermarket, only concerning ourselves with our newfound status
as socially conscious rebels.
In this new worth that we now ascribe to the can of Pepsi, its exchange-value is uncovered.
Standing in the supermarket aisle, we notice that we must pay a significantly higher price for the
Pepsi than, for instance, a pack of bottled water, but this matters little to us. Pepsi, as a commodity

56

now able to be exchanged, has had its value multiplied tenfold. This is the dream of any corporation
whose products are sold on the market, and Pepsi aside, it is seen most clearly in objects made
from precious metals or gemstones. A golden wristlet contains no use-value beyond glamorizing
part of its wearer’s body, and it is far outranked in terms of utility when compared to something
much less ornate and much more practical, such as a hammer. Even the best hammers will, at most,
cost a few hundred dollars, but a golden wristlet will exact a much more painful price. Use-value
inheres in the object, but exchange-value does not, as it is only found in the act of exchange which,
in turn, necessitates a platform of commodity exchange: a market. The social prerequisite of exchange-value is expounded upon by Marx:
As a general rule, articles of utility become commodities, only because they are products
of the labour of private individuals or groups of individuals who carry on their work independently of each other…Since the producers [of these articles] do not come into social
contact with each other until they exchange their products, the specific social character of
each producer’s labour does not show itself except in the act of exchange. In other words,
the labour of the individual asserts itself as a part of the labour of society, only by means
of the relations which the act of exchange establishes directly between the products, and
indirectly, through them, between the producers. To the latter, therefore, the relations connecting the labour of one individual with that of the rest appear, not as direct social relations
between individuals at work, but as what they really are, material relations between persons
and social relations between things. (321)
So, the can of Pepsi, along with the act of purchasing it, are transmuted into an act of social protest,
as legitimate as the most desperate struggles against tear gas, fire hoses, and rubber bullets (or so
PepsiCo would have wished).
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A few more words remain to be said. As we will determine once we come to “The German
Ideology,” the fetishizing of commodities does not occur at the same time the commodity itself is
made, and neither is every object a commodity. A commodity satisfies a social need, and it must
be available for exchange. As for the fetishizing of all commodities, it is a historical process that
mirrors the advances in productive technology that themselves mark the transition from one stage
of material history to the next. We glean two things from this. On the one hand, the commodity is
stamped with the social and technological character of the labor that produced it, and this labor is
expressed in the act of exchange, in exchange-value. On the other, because capitalism is that society in which the production of commodities is prioritized more than ever before, and actualized
through mass industrial production, it is the stage of history that has fulfilled all the prior requirements for the fetishizing of all commodities.
§12. Summation of the Work So Far
With the inclusion of commodity fetishism, we are finally ready to bring forward being-incapital as such. The rest of the chapter will thus be dedicated to either doing this or demonstrating
how being-in-capital manifests itself in the everyday experience of Dasein in capitalism. But, given
that the past 50 pages or so have seen us tread through some especially dense philosophical concepts, it is worth restating some of them here, as we have slowly been laboring toward this moment
since the start of this thesis.
Our examination of Being and Time was necessitated due to the fact that we are utilizing
Heideggerian phenomenology as our basis for this entire endeavor. Without Heidegger’s most influential work, we could not have hoped to comprehend sentences replete with terms such as
“Dasein” or “being-in-the-world.” This would have rendered our project little more than a confusing mishmash of vaguely philosophical-sounding words. His other works – “The Origin of the
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Work of Art,” the “Letter on Humanism,” and “The Question Concerning Technology” were included so that we could identify five sources of intelligibility, which, later on, we will use to make
evident the phenomenological totality of capitalism. Taken together, these four works function as
the Heideggerian skeleton to which we will now affix a Marxist flesh.
The first of the five sources of intelligibility is the tool. Though Dasein has a multitude of
ways in which to comprehend and shape its world, it enters into the mode of Zuhandenheit, or
“handiness,” when it grasps a certain tool with its hand. Our employment of the tool leads us to
uncover the world in such and such a way through Dasein’s faculty of unconcealment, or alētheia.
Tools can be either physical, or, in the case of the second source of intelligibility, a sign. Both are
phenomenological “spotlights” through which Dasein delineates its possibilities, whether interpretive or material.
The proliferation of the sign leads us to consider the third source of intelligibility: the Mitwelt. When Dasein enters this with-world, it is forced to begin to understand itself in relation to
other Dasein. It is through these others that Dasein views itself as part of a certain kind of people
at a certain time; without them, it cannot take hold of the whole of its own identity with both hands.
Lurking within the Mitwelt is Das Man, or “the they.” As we said so many pages ago, the they is
the neuter; it is not a particular person or group of people, but rather like an invisible lawgiver that
determines what is and is not intelligible at a point in history. Its clearest expressions are in phrases
like “You know what they say,” but it need not be referred to explicitly in order to exact its power.
The they causes Dasein to lose itself in the phenomenon of average everydayness, or publicness,
with its authentic potentiality-of-being-a-self ultimately being obscured from it.
We moved to “The Origin of the Work of Art” so that we could draw out the structure of
the fourth source of intelligibility, the artwork. Following Heidegger’s use of Van Gogh’s Shoes as
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his explanatory vessel, we noticed that the artwork contains an interplay between earth and world.
The earth is that raw and unadulterated phenomenal experience of such and such a thing that eludes
rational analysis. As we said, color can be explained in terms of hue and saturation, but this does
not get at what color is. The world, on the other hand, is the referential totality that the artwork
reveals to Dasein. The shoes of the peasant, framed within Van Gogh’s painting, grant us a glimpse
of the being-in-the-world of the peasant as Dasein. The unique arrangement of creases in the
leather allows us to surmise the fields she may have walked. We saw the same sort of relation in
the Greek temple. As a work of art, the temple brought to presence the god it was meant to exalt;
through ritual, the god was given life, and through this unity of temple and ritual, we learned that
such artworks divulge to us what matters to a people.
The “Letter on Humanism” merited its inclusion on two grounds: it is the only piece of
writing in which Heidegger addresses Marx by name, stating that a “productive dialogue” may be
established with him since Marx’s theory of history is, in essence, a history of alienation. Besides
this, it introduced us to the fourth source of intelligibility: language. Through our example of
Reagan’s speech to the British Parliament, it was made evident that, even in the most innocuous
and idle conversations, we tend to grasp Dasein not as Dasein, respecting its full range of possibility, but rather habitually force it into a predetermined conception of “human nature.” Hence, to
someone such as Reagan, Dasein was not Dasein, but rather the propagandized liberal subject,
endowed with God-given rights that only the United States could ever respect.
Lastly, “The Question Concerning Technology,” as perhaps the most direct piece of social
criticism Heidegger produced, guided us through the “essence” of technology. Through the phenomenological lens of enframing, all becomes standing-reserve. Natural energies are no longer
permitted to be what they are, but they are instead challenged-forth for the sake of “maximum
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yield at minimum expense” (“The Question Concerning Technology” 321). Enframing and standing-reserve stand in contrast to poiēsis and physis, which are, respectively, modes of bringing-topresence that consist in either something else or in itself. In the case of the former, the four causes
– materialis, formalis, efficiens, and finalis – determine from what, into what, how, and for what
reason an object is made. This bears similarity to “The Origin of the Work of Art” in that the object,
too, represents the opening of a phenomenological world.
From Marx, we have only taken his theory of the fetishism of commodities so far. We have
done this in order to establish that the commodity is, in addition to being a phenomenological
world, a referent to the material-historical organization which spawned it. So, a commodity produced under capitalism refers to capitalism; one created under feudalism refers to feudalism, and
so on. The unity of the phenomenological and material in the commodity is what, at long last,
permits us to see being-in-capital for ourselves. We turn to that now.
§13. Being-in-Capital as Such
Each commodity, from such a point of view, becomes much like Van Gogh’s Shoes – but
where the shoe displayed to us the world of the peasant whose feet they armored, the commodity
calls repeatedly to a power that, though produced by man, is experienced by him as an alien power.
This power, for us, is capitalism. Hence each commodity takes upon the phenomenological aspect
of a “fetish-artwork”; as the Cross summons Christ, so does the commodity summon capital. The
commodity, much like a missionary sent to a world that refuses to prostrate itself before his alien
god, preaches and proselytizes to Dasein. It tells it, very sweetly, of the eternality and naturality of
capitalism, of its pleasures and excesses. Our instinct is to cover our ears and look away from the
savage and brutal efficiency of this new deity to some sort of alternative that is kinder, gentler,
more just, but we are denied this. We cannot help but be astounded at the plenitude. We see it in
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our supermarkets, warehouses, and the homes of the wealthy. The sheer ubiquity of the commodity
echoes the omnipresence of God, and Dasein, weak before this unyielding assault, is gradually
pulled away from its home in the temple. Deprived of this source of self-knowledge, it begins to
fill this new vacuum with the image of capitalism. The penitent and pilgrim, at home in their temples, are exiled and remade into the consumer and commodity:
The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man
to his ‘natural superiors,’ and has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than
naked self-interest, than callous ‘cash payment.’ It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies
of religious fervour, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water
of egotistical calculation. It has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place
of the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable
freedom – Free Trade.” (“Manifesto of the Communist Party” 475)
So, as each commodity embodies the aspect of a fetish-artwork of whatever material system delivered it to the world, it envelops both material and phenomenological qualities. This is to say
that each commodity receives a sort of inscription upon being brought-forth: materially, the productive organization of the society which spawned it; phenomenologically, its demonstration of a
world as an artwork. The inscription specific to capitalism constitutes, at last, what we know as
being-in-capital.
§14. The Aura and the Four Causes
But we cannot end here. If we do, then this thesis will only pretend at a Heideggerian
Marxism by mechanically employing both men’s terminology in the same sentences. We must
push forward and delve into this notion of the commodity containing an “inscription” that is
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simultaneously material and phenomenological. Funnily enough, we look to a Marxist – albeit an
unusual and heterodox one, much like us – for our starting point.
Walter Benjamin is the thinker who will aid us in completing our bridging-together of
Heidegger and Marx. Earlier, our engagement with him was limited to only a single sentence from
One-Way Street, his collection of aphorisms, but now we are preoccupied with a 1935 essay of his
titled “The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility.” My reading of it is, admittedly, suffused with a Heideggerian spirit – but I get the impression that Benjamin would not
have objected to this too much, for reasons we will work through. The purpose of the essay is to
examine the effect of mass production on the artwork, which, one might imagine, bears upon being-in-capital. The first of Benjamin’s relevant theses follows:
In even the most perfect reproduction [of a work of art], one thing is lacking – the here and
now of the work of art – its unique existence in a particular place. It is this unique existence
– and nothing else – that bears the mark of the history to which the work has been subject.
The here and now of the original underlies the concept of its authenticity…The whole
sphere of authenticity eludes technological – and, of course not only technological – reproduction. (“Technological Reproducibility” 103)
So, something is lost from the artwork once it undergoes mass mechanical reproduction. This is
not at all hard to see. Private collectors with plenty of funds at their disposal would likely pay
millions for the original of The Scream, or the Mona Lisa, or Guernica, but none (assuming they
are in their right minds) would pay the same sum for a copy of these artworks, whether repainted
on historically-accurate canvas or printed on a two-dollar ceramic mug. The reason for this is because that thing that makes the original the original has been severed from its copies. Benjamin
calls this severed and discarded quality the “aura” of an artwork:
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The authenticity of a thing is the quintessence of all that is transmissible from its origin on,
ranging from its physical duration to the historical testimony relating to it…And what is
really jeopardized when the historical testimony is affected is the authority of the object,
the weight it derives from tradition. One might focus the aspects of the artwork in the concept of the aura, and go on to say: what withers in the age of the technological reproducibility of the work of art is the latter’s aura. This process is symptomatic; its significance
extends far beyond the realm of art. It might be stated as a general formula that the technology of reproduction detaches the reproduced object from the sphere of tradition. By
replicating the work many times over, it substitutes a mass existence for a unique existence.
(103-104)
The structure of the inscription begins to appear, but, before we attempt our fusion, we must make
note of the historical genesis Benjamin ascribes to the aura:
The uniqueness of a work of art is identical to its embeddedness in the context of tradition.
Of course, this tradition is thoroughly alive and extremely changeable. An ancient statue
of Venus, for instance, existed in a traditional context for the Greeks (who made it an object
of worship) that was different from the context in which it existed for medieval clerics
(who viewed it as a sinister idol). But what was equally evident to both was its uniqueness
– that is, its aura. Originally, the embeddedness of the artwork in the context of tradition
found expression in a cult. As we know, the earliest art works originated in the service of
rituals – first magical, then religious. And it is highly significant that artwork’s auratic
mode of existence is never entirely severed from its ritual function. In other words: the
unique value of the ‘authentic’ work of art always has its basis in ritual. (105)
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Benjamin’s inclusion of the ritual as the birthplace of the artwork touches directly on the Greek
temple that Heidegger considered in “The Origin of the Work of Art.” The temple is the site of the
openness of the historical Dasein of the Greeks, and within its walls, their god, simultaneously an
emblem of what matters to them, is brought into presence through the rituals meant to honor it.
This bringing-forth admits of a structure in itself. We uncovered it during our time with
Heidegger’s “The Question Concerning Technology.” Though we were more concerned with enframing and standing-reserve the first time around, we did make note of the four causes. Here we
repeat Heidegger’s introduction of them:
For centuries philosophy has taught that there are four causes: (1) the causa materialis, the
material, the matter out of which, for example, a silver chalice is made; (2) the causa formalis, the form, the shape into which the material enters; (3) the causa finalis, the end, for
example, the sacrificial rite in relation to which the required chalice is determined as to its
form and matter; (4) the causa efficiens, which brings about the effect that is the finished,
actual chalice, the silversmith. (“The Question Concerning Technology” 313-314)
Heidegger identified the silversmith as the cause to which the other three are indebted. His relationship to them is not one of simple causality, in which one physical object simply results in the
creation of something else. Rather, it is through his handiwork, itself conditioned and mediated by
his historical being-in-the-world, that the chalice is allowed to become what it is; in other words,
it is through the smith’s Being that the chalice is given avenue to “presence” into unconcealment.
This is the nature of its indebtedness to him, and it is what earns the silversmith his status as causa
efficiens.
We also take special issue with the causa finalis. The reason why the chalice was created
in the first place, like nearly everything else in this thesis, is historically sensitive. Even if a
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people’s rituals continue to venerate the same god over thousands of years, then their reason for
doing so changes. And even if their reason for doing so stays the same, their manner of constructing
the ritual object evolves. The causa efficiens is therefore historically sensitive as well. Materialis
and formalis likely not as much, but surely, it must be conceded that a phenomenological change
occurs when the forging of a silver chalice is the result of a series of machines, and not a silversmith
situated in history as Dasein. Thus, the causa finalis behind the creation of a statue of Venus is
markedly unalike that which inspired the crafting of a crucifix, and, as Benjamin has written, its
respective creators reflect such dissimilarity. The context of tradition that led to the gestation and
ultimate birth of either is distinct: “…this tradition is thoroughly alive and extremely changeable”
(“Technological Reproducibility” 105).
The “presencing” of a god via the fetish-artwork is therefore not something static – the
ritual and its objects, in correspondence with the historical sensitivity of the four causes and means,
forces, and relations of production, all evolve over the course of millennia. This evolution is, as
we have repeatedly stated, both material and phenomenological. In regard to the former, the creation of a silver chalice presupposes the availability of silver, of tools, of the knowledge necessary
to mine, process, and shape it, a market in order to procure everything, and lastly, the silversmith
himself. Phenomenologically, through the four causes, the silversmith, as a historical Dasein in
that particular moment in history and in respect to his particular ritual, brings the chalice to presence. In this act of creation, of bringing to presence, the silversmith has imparted his Being into
the chalice. As much as it is made of silver, it is “made” of his Being. It summons him, as it is
something only he could have made.
But as the present dissolves into the past, the relationship between the silversmith and the
object of his labor is transformed. Its historical sensitivity leaves it vulnerable to changes in the
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material mode of production and, as the nature of such production advances and mutates, he finds
himself less and less involved in the making of new chalices. He is, after all, only one man, and a
man who tires, at that. He is no match for the new industrial technologies that have severed him
from the object of his labor. A change has transpired.
Industrial capital and mass production have come to the world, and these provide the foundation for being-in-capital, as a discrete phenomenon, to come about. So, we ask: what occurs to
the causa finalis and causa efficiens following the advent of capitalism, more specifically, following the advent of mass capitalist commodity production? A partial answer has already been supplied for us by Benjamin: “It might be stated as a general formula that the technology of reproduction detaches the reproduced object from the sphere of tradition. By replicating the work many
times over, it substitutes a mass existence for a unique existence” (104).
Capitalism severs, in Heidegger’s language, the causa finalis from its causa efficiens. The
hands of the silversmith, worn and calloused from years of creating chalices for the sake of those
rituals meant to honor his gods, are replaced with production line and wheezing smokestack. His
labor, once the conduit for the poiēsis of his Dasein and that of his people’s, is now reduced to a
litany of empty, cynical imitations. Objects essential to the self-knowledge of a historical Dasein
are ripped from their original context and sold, much like everything else, for a certain quantity of
money.
The phenomenological consequence of such a detachment is that, deprived of the awareness of historically-determined alternative possibilities of Being that lie outside of the logic of
capital, Dasein has no choice but to submit to its power. It ceases recognizing itself as Dasein, as
a being-in-the-world with the potentiality-of-being-a-self. With an air of resignation, prompted by
the unerring rhythm of capital, Dasein starts to know itself as a commodity. Those of us already
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familiar with Marx know that human beings, through their labor-power, are forced to sell themselves as commodities in order to live. This is not in question. But what we now know through
being-in-capital is how this transformation may be experienced subjectively as well. Consciously
or not, Dasein becomes absorbed into the great cycle of production and reproduction that maintains
the façade of ideological superiority so necessary to capitalism, and a phenomenological “stickiness” takes hold. Because, as we saw in “The Question Concerning Technology,” it is the danger
of industrial technology that we perceive the world as only what can be measured, calculated, and
exploited, and because this technology is intrinsic to capitalist mass production, Dasein falls prey
to the danger. It enframes the world and itself.
“All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned…” (“Manifesto of the Communist
Party” 68). Every identity, despite appearing revolutionary and subversive at its incipience, is absorbed into the inhuman quantification of exchange-value, as something calculable and exploitable. Dasein no longer sees a man by way of the Mitwelt, letting him appear as the Dasein that he
is, but as a pair of hands to be extracted of surplus-value. Dasein no longer sees a woman but a
body to be exploited. Dasein no longer sees anyone at all, reducing them to the status of useful or
useless things, and Dasein no longer sees itself, being forced to sell itself as useful to an employer.
This, then, is being-in-capital.
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Fig. 9: Ryōan-ji (The Temple of the Dragon at Peace) – Kyoto, Japan – 1450
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§15. The Concrete Manifestation of Being-in-Capital
But it must be seen how being-in-capital manifests concretely. Otherwise, we remain lost
in the dizzying heights of philosophical theory, not ever returning to earth. The best way to achieve
this is through the use of, as we have done so many times already, an example. Some come to mind
with minimal effort: Che Guevara’s visage on shirts produced in sweatshops, each home to legions
of exploited proletarians; the fake Mayan-Aztec bas-reliefs dispiritedly placed inside every
Chipotle restaurant, whose origin is none other than Denver, Colorado; the rapidity with which the
reunified German state began to sell off parts of the Berlin Wall. But these, while indicative of the
cynicism and soullessness that capitalism contains in its very spirit, would not serve us in the way
that we need. The object of our focus must be a discrete cultural and historical icon that has been
rid of its past.
Japan, as one of the hotbeds of Zen Buddhism, contains many rock gardens. The monks,
housed in their monasteries, count it among their duties to maintain these gardens, which is no
small feat. The gardens – for instance, Ryōan-ji, in Kyoto, pictured above – are simple, but only
deceptively so. The sand that forms the sea all in between the rocks must be raked, so as to give
the impression each pebble flows together, like water. The gardens are steeped in, and symbolic
of, a great tradition that simultaneously comes to embody the expression of Zen Buddhism in
Japan. Should we try to subject the composition of Ryōan-ji to scientific analysis, then we witness
the same phenomenological collapse of the rock garden as we did with the earth. It is true that the
rock garden is a specifically-arranged collection of pebbles, vegetation, and stone, but to describe
it purely as such is to cover over what it is. Ryōan-ji thus seems to speak – but not to us. It is a
very strong claim to say with certainty that only particular people or kinds of people are privy to
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its mysteries, but surely, we can say that a Buddhist monk, especially one that has tended the rocks
for many years, hears its voice better than we.
Enter the great virtual marketplace, Amazon, whose transformation of global trade and
consumption would challenge the faith of even the most devout of monks. With an unprecedented
level of convenience and quickness, each of us – provided we have the necessary funds available
– can order nearly anything on Amazon. Some days later, after journeying through a dizzying
spiderweb of shipping lanes and warehouses, whatever we ordered is placed on our doormat,
wrapped in a neat little box with the Amazon logo plastered on one side or the other. It is a process
we have done dozens, if not hundreds, of times. However, one afternoon, one commodity among
the otherwise endless sea of commodities catches our eye more than the rest: a small desk replica
of a Japanese Zen Buddhist garden, complete with (artificial) sand, rocks, and bonsai trees. Soon
after noticing its low price, we make our purchase and anxiously await it in the mail.
It arrives in the morning. We rush to retrieve the package, although some of our excitement
becomes consternation as we hurry a little too quickly, spilling coffee on our shirts. We are now in
a state of agitation – which, as we all know, is the ideal state to be in when one plans to ponder the
mysteries of Zen Buddhism. Time passes, and the coffee dries. Our garden is now fully assembled,
and with half-drunk coffee mug set aside, we pull it near. Our fingers grip the wooden rake meant
for carving lines in the sand.
This moment encapsulates all we have worked out so far. It is such a simple thing to idly
play with a replica of a Zen Buddhist garden, so far removed from its historical and cultural context
for Dasein, but it is another matter entirely to know it. In interacting with it, the commodity is
given a voice – like the artwork, it speaks. But where the artwork would speak to us of its history,
the earth, and the world, the commodity only addresses us in half-measures and distorted whispers,
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as if it is voicing itself to us while submerged under many meters of water. It does this because it
is nothing but a copy, a liquidated, commodified, and fetishized referent to a history that itself has
been liquidated, commodified, and fetishized. As a fetish born from capitalist mass production, it
bears the schism between causa finalis and causa efficiens: there are no centuries of Japanese Zen
Buddhism ingrained in it, and there is no monk to diligently care for it, to bring it into Being.
Instead, it was made in some Chinese, Indian, or Latin American factory somewhere, completely
severed from any semblance of either Japanese history or Buddhism. Commodified and miniaturized, the only purpose of this toy Zen garden is to satisfy our momentary whims – whims that
anyone else, regardless of age, sex, gender, race, culture, history, and so on, could have had.
When a Buddhist monk sits on the landing of Ryōan-ji, he knows the rituals the space
demands of him, and through them, knows himself. Respectfully, he kneels and bows his head,
ready to meditate. Conversely, when we sit at our desks, momentarily entertained by this play of
plastic rock, artificial sand, and crudely painted moss before us, no such demand is exacted upon
us. We have already paid the price of admission – and this is where the phenomenological consequence of the split between causa efficiens and causa finalis is seen in its concreteness. Ryōan-ji
speaks to the Dasein of the monk because he has ears to hear it; the commodity speaks to no one
in particular. Of course, we already know this “no one” as Das Man. Recall how Heidegger spoke
of the they in Being and Time:
One belongs to the others oneself, and entrenches their power. ‘The others,’ whom one
designates as such in order to cover one’s own essential belonging to them, are those who
are there initially and for the most part in everyday being-with-one-another. The who is
not this one and not that one, not oneself, not some, and not the sum of them all. The ‘who’
is the neuter, the they…Everyone is the other, and no one is himself. The they, which

72

supplies the answer to the who of everyday Dasein, is the nobody to whom every Dasein
has always surrendered itself, in its being-among-one-another. (Being and Time 123-124)
The commodity thus speaks to Dasein only as it remains faceless, skinless, without a history. It
entices Dasein into its timelessness, engulfing it in the void that remains when Dasein no longer
recognizes its historical possibilities of Being: capitalism.
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Fig. 10: Paul Klee – Angelus Novus – 1920
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§16. “The German Ideology” – Preparation
Now to trace out the historical progression of being-in-capital. Despite the fact that it liquidates history and severs Dasein from its past, its emergence as a phenomenon admits of its own
historical development, and that is what we busy ourselves with now. This development runs parallel to the degree of technological advancement that is expressed in the material organization of
a given society. As the means, forces, and relations of production transform and intensify from
stage to stage of history, so does the schism between causa efficiens and causa finalis widen. The
culmination of this widening comes in the genesis of industrial capitalism.
But to best comprehend this process, we must engage with Marx once more. We do this
simply because there is no understanding Karl Marx, capitalism, or being-in-capital without understanding his theory of history. Precisely for the sake of this understanding, however, we would
do well by cheating just a little and getting ahead of him. Owing to his philosophical training in
Hegel and the rest of the German Idealists, Marx moves through history dialectically rather than
sequentially. This adds a remarkable level of richness to his work – but it also impels the reader to
juggle multiple contradictions at once, opening up the possibility for confusion and distortion. So,
if we state openly and clearly ahead of time the historical tendencies that are outlined in “The
German Ideology,” along with some philosophical points that are central to his system – and our
own – in general, we will both contextualize the work and allot ourselves more space in which to
demonstrate the gradual detachment of causa finalis from causa efficiens.
The first – and most crucial – of these points that we must make note of here is the Marxist
conception of the human being. Near the start of “The German Ideology,” Marx intimates to us the
following:
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Men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion or anything else you
like. They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin
to produce their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical organisation. By producing their means of subsistence men are indirectly producing their actual
material life. (“The German Ideology” 150)
For Marx, then, production is the essential faculty that both defines and concretizes the Being of
human beings. To take it even further, production plays such a central role in Marx’s historical and
philosophical systems that he can be said to view man not as “man,” empty and vague concept that
it is, but as homo faber – in Latin, “man the maker.” Therefore, “The German Ideology,” as a
whole, can be read as a historical account of the productive powers of man, or – to be a little more
faithful to Marx’s Hegelian roots – the journey of man conquering his own alienation via his powers of production. This puts him in quite a bit of tension with Heidegger, as Marx has committed
the cardinal sin of covering over the Being of Dasein with the restricted and short-sighted Being
of homo faber. We will revisit this later as we move through “The Economic and Philosophic
Manuscripts of 1844.”
The second point concerns the development of these powers, which are themselves organized and limited along two matrices: the forces and relations of production. To supply an example
of the former: my copy of The Marx-Engels Reader was printed here, in the United States. We can
imagine that this book came about through a combination of different contributions. Obviously,
Marx and Engels had to labor all those years ago to produce the words that would eventually be
printed, but out of necessity, there had to be some other forces in place – workers, machines, or
both – that gathered up the necessary cellulose for the paper, the chemicals for the ink, and so on.
Moreover, someone or something had to bind together the loose reams of paper into a book, set
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printing press to it, and later ship it off to the bookstore I purchased it in. Thus it is the case that
this single copy of The Marx-Engels Reader necessitated a multitude of laborers and kinds of
labor: editors, publishers, technicians, printing presses, loggers, and so on and so forth. Taken
together, all of these fonts of labor form the forces of production.
The relations of production are very slightly more difficult to grasp, but still quite indispensable to our understanding of capitalism (and indeed, any mode of production). Part of our
analysis of Being and Time discussed the existential category of the Mitwelt – the “with-world.”
Dasein cohabitates the earth with other Dasein, and it derives part of its self and world-understanding from these others. Dasein cannot exist sundered from the Mitwelt, and the nature of the Mitwelt
is historically conditioned. The relationship between homo faber and his community is similar in
Marx. Each historical mode of production, whether the ancient city-state, the feudal manor, or the
capitalist manufacturing plant, contains within itself a set of social relationships that are intrinsic
to that mode of production. So, the ancient city-state necessitates the slave-master and slave, feudalism necessitates the lord and peasant, and capitalism necessitates the bourgeois and proletarian.
It is “part” of capitalism that I am in a relationship of dependence with my landlord, that the proletarian is paid a wage for their labor, etc. The relations of production are therefore the materially
necessary set of social relationships that each human being, whether oppressor or oppressed, must
enter into at a given point in history.
This oppressive element of the relations of production finds its clearest expression in the
larger distinction between propertied and propertyless. We may deviate from “The German Ideology” for a moment and look to The Communist Manifesto in order to clarify this. Everyone knows
of the specter haunting Europe, but what is relevant for us follows closely behind:
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The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles. Freeman and
slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary
re-constitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes.” (“Manifesto of the Communist Party” 473-474)
Lastly, both the forces and relations of production have, generally speaking, advanced, intensified,
and multiplied over the course of history. This is what has led to the sundering between the causa
finalis and causa efficiens. Their separation is parallel to that of technology and the division of
labor. In turn, the intensification of all these “…develops gradually with increase of population,
the growth of wants, and with the extension of external relations, both of war and of barter” (“The
German Ideology” 151). We will see this for ourselves as we progress through “The German Ideology.” Our preparatory points and patterns are thus uncovered:
1. The history of humanity begins when it produces its own life, i.e., when it labors to clothe
itself, house itself, feed itself, through its own productive powers. We call Marx’s conception of the human being homo faber (“man the maker”).
2. The forces of production are comprised of all the productive powers within society, whether
artificial or human. The relations of production are those social relationships that are necessitated by the material mode of production. Each historical stage admits of its own organization of these two, and each transition between the stages represents a simultaneous
intensification and revolutionizing of the forces and relations.
3. History is the history of class struggle.
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4. The upshot of these intensifications is threefold: the division of labor becomes more specialized, productive technology is rendered more efficient, and the peoples of the world
enter into increasingly dependent relationships with one another via economic globalization. This is referred to by Marx as intercourse.
The Marxian theory of history is roughly organized along these four patterns. They serve as the
wheels of the engine of history, with humanity as its director. We may now begin with “The German Ideology” in full.
§17. The Tribe
The first mature organization of the forces and relations of production in human history is
found in the tribe. Marx comments: “[The tribal form of production] corresponds to the undeveloped stage of production, at which a people lives by hunting and fishing, by the rearing of beasts
or, in the highest stage, agriculture” (151). In the tribal epoch, which ended some 12,000 years ago,
there is no such thing as trade or globalization, beyond the passing contact one nomadic tribe might
have with another. The concept of property (at least in the way we comprehend it today) is nonexistent. Industry is limited to the simple production the tribespeople engage in in order to sustain
themselves, and the performance of this “industrial” labor is divided into two roles: the hunter and
gatherer. The complexity of the relations of production is confined to the power exercised within
the tribe by “patriarchal chieftains” over the rest of its members, but Marx does not consider this
a class antagonism in the usual sense – the hierarchy between the chieftains and the tribesmen is
merely social, ungrounded by material actuality (151).
We will not trouble ourselves here with a very detailed inquest into the Being of the tribe
since productive capacity is virtually absent, especially understood in comparison to the later
stages of history. Moreover, because intercourse between disparate nomadic tribes is, as we have

79

said, very limited, the simple object only rarely rises to the status of a fetishized commodity. Nevertheless, one can think of some objects, laden with cultural significance, that later become commodities, e.g., tobacco pipes utilized by Native American nomadic peoples for religious purposes,
or masks employed by African tribes for their coming-of-age rituals.
§18. The Ancient City-State
After a few thousand years, the tribe settles and agrarianizes. This signals the arrival of
Marx’s second historical stage: the ancient city-state, which “…proceeds especially from the union
of several tribes into a city by agreement or by conquest, and which is still accompanied by slavery” (151). The clearest instances of tribes coming together in this way is in the founding of the
great ancient civilizations, e.g., Ur, Babylonia, Egypt, etc. Concomitant with the settling of the
tribes into city-states is an uptick in, as Marx writes, population and trade. Commercial routes,
such as the old Silk Road that linked Europe to Asia, are established. The city appears for the first
time in history as a social and economic hub, as a center of production.
It would be an error to claim here that Marx casts class struggle as a sort of precondition
to history. The dialectical opposition between the propertied and propertyless is only the result of
the material movement of history itself. We have already seen that the very idea of property was
not yet in existence during the time of the tribe, but by the time of antiquity, it has come into being:
Beside communal ownership we already find…private property developing, but as an abnormal form subordinate to communal ownership. The citizens hold power over their labouring slaves only in their community, and on this account alone, therefore, they are
bound to the form of communal ownership. It is the communal private property which
compels the active citizens to remain in this spontaneously derived form of association
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over against their slaves…The class relation between citizens and slaves is now completely
developed. (151)
As is it still the case more than 2000 years later, the material domination of the slave-master over
the slave is concretized in the ownership of property.
In agreement with our fourth pattern, the relations and forces of production see their first
intensification. Now that the residents of the city have had their physical needs (food, water, shelter, etc.) met in such a way that those outside of it have not, they are able to rely on others for the
satisfaction of some of their wants. It is not difficult to see this unfolding. If we say, for example,
that Cleopatra, Queen of Egypt, suddenly desired a new necklace to further entice Mark Antony,
she would first need to overcome several obstacles. If we assume that she wishes that her necklace
be made of gold and lapis lazuli, these must be sourced, extracted, refined from raw material,
molded, assembled, then imported. Thankfully for her, the Nile is a natural provider of gold, but
the lapis lazuli must instead be sent to Egypt from far-off Bactria. Moreover, she must find and
hire a craftsman that is both able and willing to assemble her necklace. She would probably have
no trouble with this, considering no one would turn down the pharaoh.
Let us pause here for a moment. Materially, this example of Cleopatra and the craftsman
that we have created is fairly straightforward. In this particular transaction, that is itself conditioned
by the ancient mode of production, the forces of production are represented by the craftsman and
all the laborers, enslaved or otherwise, involved in supplying him with the resources necessary for
the forging of the necklace. The relations of production are visible as well. As the primary class
distinction in the ancient world was between the citizen and the slave, the slaves involved in the
gathering of the gold and lapis lazuli had no choice but to enter into that relationship of dependence
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with their masters. As property themselves, they were necessarily beholden to the interests of the
citizens, which, in this case, include both the craftsman and Cleopatra.
But what distinguishes the ancient mode of production from that of the tribe, at least for
our purposes, is the emergence of a market. Capital, Volume One imparted to us that the commodity is only fetishized if it is able to be exchanged, which, of course, presupposes the availability of
a market that serves as a platform for such exchange. And with the genesis of the market comes
the genesis – though certainly not the terminus – of the separation between causa efficiens and
causa finalis. This is because, as mass production has not yet come into being, any commodity,
whether a golden necklace requisitioned by the Queen of Egypt or a simple reed pen made by a
royal scribe, is still situated within the context of tradition. The necklace and pen are indeed commodities because they satisfy a need, but they have not yet been fetishized. This is all in keeping
with our earlier discussions of the dual phenomenological and material nature of the commodity
as embodied in the four causes and the progression of the forces, means, and relations of production, but here, now, we see it concretely. If we must represent visually the current unity between
causa efficiens and causa finalis at this moment in history, then, very simply, we may say it is
found in the maker’s marks the artisans of old would leave upon their creations: their hands
brought the object to presence, and because of this, their historical Being is inscribed upon it. As
the silver chalice was brought to presence by the silversmith, himself immersed in history as
Dasein, so are the craftsman and scribe responsible for, respectively, the necklace and the pen.
There is, as of now, no empty void to be filled by the phenomenological inscription of capitalism,
and capitalism itself has not yet entered the world.
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§19. Feudalism
Marx presents us to his third stage of history with a crucial addendum: “The third form of
ownership is feudal or estate property. If antiquity started out from the town and its little territory,
the [feudalist] Middle Ages started out from the country” (“The German Ideology” 152). The ancient mode of production has now fallen to the wayside, with its dependence on slave labor alongside it. Slaves are, of course, still in existence during feudalism, but they have been supplanted as
the major productive force by two major groups: the “enserfed small peasantry” in the country and
the artisanal guildsmen in the city (152).
For the moment, let us fixate on the serfs. We know that justice, along with physical protection, were some of the privileges that a serf could expect in return for binding himself to the
lord’s manor. Of course, this would come at a price: the serf would only be allowed these privileges
so long as he labored somehow on the land of the lord, encircled by the walls of the castle. The
medieval manor thus constitutes the archetypal image of feudalist society. The noble lord, of royal
blood and issued his estate by the monarch himself, resides in its towers. Far below, but still within
its walls, is a mass of serfs, involved in the upkeep of this tiny pocket of civilization – a blacksmith,
sweating over his bellows; a cook, stocking the larder; a farmer, picking away at the crops of the
harvest of 1184. This, then, is the form of class struggle unique to the rural expression of feudalism,
an inseparable component of the feudal relations of production:
The hierarchical structure of landownership, and the armed bodies of retainers associated
with it, gave the nobility power over the serfs. This feudal organisation was, just as much
as the ancient communal ownership, an association against a subjected producing class,
but the form of association and the relation to the direct producers were different because
of the different conditions of production. (153)
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But as we have already said, the serf was not the only productive class during the Middle Ages.
Accompanying them in their productivity were their urban counterparts, the artisans: i.e., the cobblers, smiths, tailors, masons, and so on.
These craftsmen organized themselves into the historical ancestor of the modern corporation, the guilds. Marx explains for us their genesis:
The competition of serfs constantly escaping into the town, the constant war of the country
against the towns and thus the necessity of an organised municipal military force, the bond
of common ownership in a particular kind of labour, the necessity of common buildings for
sale of their wares at a time when craftsmen were also traders, and the consequent exclusion
of the unauthorised from these buildings, the conflict among the interests among the various
crafts, the necessity of protecting their laboriously acquired skill, and the feudal organisation
of the whole of the country: these were the causes of the union of the workers of each craft
in guilds. (176-177)
A little scrutiny reveals the form of struggle unique to the guild. In their innately hierarchical
structure, the guilds provided a career path for the aspiring craftsmen of the feudal era. So, if some
young man in medieval Berlin decided to become a glazier, he would be directed to the workshop
of a local master, himself a glazier with decades of experience and the owner of a workshop. Now
formally accepted as an apprentice, our glazier-in-training would, to an extent, replicate the dependency of the serf upon the lord with his master. He would not be paid a wage, as the serf is not,
but would instead be given food and shelter in return for his work. Employed alongside him would
be the higher-ranking journeyman, who, in contrast, had the right to demand a wage, and was not
tied to the workshop of the master. An antagonism is thus present within the guild as it is in the
manor, but it is not as strictly class-based nor as obvious in its brutality:
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The journeymen and apprentices were organised in each craft as it best suited the interests
of the masters. The patriarchal relationship existing between them and their masters gave
the latter a double power – on the one hand because of their influence on the whole life of
the journeymen, and on the other because, for the journeymen who worked with the same
master, it was a real bond which held them together against the journeymen of other masters
and separated them from these. And finally, the journeymen were bound to the existing
order by their simple interests in becoming masters themselves. (177)
There is something that we should discern here, as it bears upon our preoccupation with causa
efficiens and causa finalis. In contrast to the bourgeoisie that would later follow, the medieval guild
represents a sort of union between production and commerce. Of course, the two are still in tension
with one another, but what is striking is that each member of the guild “…had to be versed in a
whole round of tasks, had to be able to make everything that was to be made with his tools” (178).
The owner of each productive workshop, owing to their skill in their trade, participated in the
generation of their own livelihood.
Hence, despite the fact that the fissure between causa finalis and causa efficiens has grown
in conjunction with the advancement of the means, forces, and relations of production, total separation is still not at hand. Because the urban guildsmen are still involved in the production of the
commodities they offer for sale, and because the serfs remain more or less isolated to their lords’
manors (thereby not having access to the market), the schism is yet again delayed. Dasein and its
self and world-understanding are still rooted in the context of tradition, though these roots continue
to shrink with each passing year. And there is no clearer glimpse of this coming rootlessness than
in the provenance of a certain class of people whose function is not to produce, but to manage and
sell the labor-power of others:
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The next extension of the division of labour was the separation of production and commerce, the formation of a special class of merchants; a separation which, in the towns bequeathed by a former period, had been handed down…and which very soon appeared in
the newly formed ones. (178)
This collective is none other than the infamous bourgeoisie, though they are still very small and
weak. The arrival of the bourgeoisie on the world stage sounds out the death rattle of feudalism.
§20. Mercantilism and Manufactures
Though capitalism – meaning that free-market system which takes private property, commodity production, and the struggle of proletariat and bourgeoisie as its essential features – came
into being in roughly the 14th century, it has expressed itself in three forms as of the present moment: mercantile, industrial, and finance. The former of these continued from about the time of the
European Renaissance to the Industrial Revolution. Industrial capitalism, its time of birth being
somewhat obvious owing to its name, can be said, very approximately, to have ended in the mid20th century or so – at least for the West. Finance capitalism is thus the variant under which we
live. Following Marx, the former two are the only ones we will address explicitly (at least until we
come to Detroit).
As has been the case with the prior transitions from stage to stage of history, the forces,
relations, and means of production undergo a revolutionizing: the comparatively limited and simplistic productive capacity of the guild, unable to respond to the enormous pressures of now-global
demand, is gradually replaced by great corporate manufactures (as of now only barely industrializing). Marx comments:
The immediate consequence of the division of labour between the various towns was the
use of manufactures, branches of production which had outgrown the guild-system.
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Manufactures first flourished, in Italy and later in Flanders, under the historical premise of
commerce with foreign nations. In other countries, England and France for example, manufactures were at first confined to the home market…manufactures depend on an already
advanced concentration of population, particularly in the countryside, and of capital, which
began to accumulate in the hands of individuals, partly in the guilds in spite of the guild
regulations, partly among the merchants. (“The German Ideology” 180)
Moreover, whereas feudalism was marked by an emphasis on immovable capital, e.g., the manor
of the lord or the workshop of the guild master, mercantile capitalism is, more than anything else,
fixated on trade. Of course, such a dependence on trade also fosters a need to control it, and such
control was determined via the struggle for great intracontinental and transcontinental shipping
lanes. Whereas, to paraphrase Marx, Rome never became more than a city due to its lack of material power over its subjects, here the political power of a nation fuses with its productive capacity:
With the advent of manufactures, the various nations entered into a competitive relationship, the struggle for trade, which was fought out in wars, protective duties and prohibitions, whereas earlier, the nations, insofar as they were connected at all, had carried on an
inoffensive exchange with each other. Trade had from now on a political significance. (181)
Socially, the birth of capitalism carries with it a plethora of consequences. We gleaned from our
time with Cleopatra and the feudal lords and peasants that, though intercourse (meaning economic
dependence) between peoples is endemic to all forms of material production, what changes between each is to what extent. Whereas the Egyptian Queen was, at most, reliant on the sourcing of
lapis lazuli from Bactria, now, under mercantile capitalism, an English aristocrat in London is
granted the ability to enjoy a cigar whose leaves were cultivated in Cuba. The world market gradually comes into view. All the skill of the journeyman and apprentice cannot compete against
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legions of barely compensated “unskilled” proletarians. The feudal social order slowly falls victim
to the march of history:
With the advent of manufacture the relationship between worker and employer changed.
In the guilds the patriarchal relationship between journeyman and master continued to exist; in manufacture its place was taken by the monetary relation between worker and capitalist – a relationship which in the countryside and in small towns retained a patriarchal
tinge, but in the larger, the real manufacturing towns, quite early lost almost all patriarchal
complexion. (182)
In response to increased demand and globalization, the division of labor grows once more in specialization and multiplicity – and now, such specialization and multiplicity have outgrown the need
for human eyes and limbs. Their labor is now outsourced to great machines, able to work much
faster, more efficiently, and far longer than any human being. Such machines entice the bourgeoisie
like nothing else, as the ideal worker is one that does not need to rest, or be paid, fed, housed, or
clothed. The relative sophistication of the artisans of the feudal era is no longer found, as industry
casts all of human society into the great Marxist dichotomy of proletariat and bourgeoisie; as part
of the former, a great productive mass whose role diminishes as alienated automation progresses;
as part of the latter, their employers, landlords, creditors, and so on.
Industrial capitalism has come into the world, and this is where Dasein enters the void. But
rather than looking to Heidegger to explain for us once more how such alienation has come about,
let us stay with Marx just a while longer:
[Big industry] forced all individuals to strain their energy to the utmost. It destroyed as far
as possible ideology, religion, morality, etc., and where it could not do this, made them into
a palpable lie. It produced world history for the first time, insofar as it made all civilised
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nations and every individual member of them dependent for the satisfaction of their wants
on the whole world, thus destroying the former natural exclusiveness of separate nations.
It made natural science subservient to capital and took from the division of labour the last
semblance of its natural character. It destroyed natural growth in general, as far as this is
possible while labour exists, and resolved all natural relationships into money relationships… [Its first premise] was the automatic system. (“Manifesto of the Communist Party”
185)
To repeat ourselves: even God finds a price. Following Benjamin, with the advent of mass production, the aura is lost from the original object. Nothing orients Dasein in the world any longer, and
capitalism rushes to fill this void.
So, to summarize: though the sundering of causa efficiens and causa finalis finds its prerequisites long before the arrival of industrial capitalism, it is only with the advent of mass production that the sundering is complete. As the forces, means, and relations of production are intensified and revolutionized in accordance with advances in productive technology, Dasein wanders
further and further from its historically-derived self and world-knowledge. This self and worldknowledge is itself gathered from a multitude of sources of intelligibility that, like the means,
forces, and relations of production, are historically sensitive. Before the birth of industrial mass
production, these sources of intelligibility – being the tool, the sign, the artwork, language, and
Das Man – look to history when they speak to Dasein. They are as the shoes of the peasant, revealing Being to Dasein. When industrial mass production appears, however, the connection between these sources and history is liquidated. Capitalism takes advantage of this liquidation, and
rushes to fill the vacuum. Dasein, now reeling and disoriented from a radical shift in its self and
world-understanding, has no recourse but to view itself and its companions as beings in and of
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capitalism. The world is no longer the world – it is a storehouse of calculable and exploitable
energies. Dasein is no longer Dasein, but a laborer, itself a fetishized commodity. The gradual
separation between causa efficiens and causa finalis is thus, at the risk of speaking too forcefully,
the basis for the history of alienation in a Heideggerian Marxism.
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Fig. 11: Laurence Stephen Lowry – A Manufacturing Town – 1922
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§21. “The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844” – Preparation
But what is this alienation, as originally envisioned by Marx? I have written that part of
the work of this second chapter is to remedy what I view as a flaw in Marx, i.e., his theory of
alienation. We have heretofore provided the remedy through our concept of being-in-capital, but
we have not yet completed our diagnosis of the malady, and we cannot rationally have one without
the other. Therefore, we must turn to Marx’s most extended analysis of alienation (Verfremtdung)
as such: “The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844.”
As we prepared ourselves for “The German Ideology” with an outright declaration of the
general patterns of Marxist historical materialism, we must do the same for the “Manuscripts.”
Especially, we should clarify here that the philosophical basis for the alienation Marx speaks of in
the “Manuscripts” is markedly dissimilar to the alienation Heidegger describes in Being and Time.
This is because, where Heidegger employs a novel variant of phenomenology to relay the structure
and experience of Dasein’s being-in-the-world, Marx instead works from the method of his grandest philosophical influence, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: more specifically, his dialectic. We
will not dive into the complexities of the dialectic, as doing so would (again) blur the lines between
a thesis and a dissertation. This being said, there is one feature of Marx’s appropriation of the
dialectic that we must make apparent if we are to grasp the “Manuscripts” at all.
In truth, we have already mentioned it. During our piecing-together of being-in-capital, we
noted that Marx differs from Heidegger in one very significant respect, i.e., for Marx, the human
being is not Dasein, but homo faber. This “essence,” of the human, Marx writes, consists in his
ability to create, to produce:
Men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion or anything else you
like. They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin
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to produce their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical organisation. By producing their means of subsistence men are indirectly producing their actual
material life. (“The German Ideology” 150)
Marx’s specific term for this essence is species-being, and it is, to speak very generally, what is
alienated from humanity through labor that is neither self-directed nor self-governed. Each proletarian, whose necessary activity in capitalist society is to sell his power as a laborer in order to
live, is thereby alienated from himself:
But the exercise of labour power, labour, is the worker’s own life-activity, the manifestation
of his own life. And this life-activity he sells to another person in order to secure the necessary means of subsistence…He does not even reckon labour as part of his life, it is rather
a sacrifice of his life. It is a commodity which he has made over to another. Hence, also,
the product of his activity is not the object of his activity. What he produces for himself is
not the silk that he weaves, nor the gold that he draws from the mine, not the palace that he
builds. What he produces for himself is wages, and silk, gold, palace resolve themselves
for him into a definite quantity of the means of subsistence, perhaps into a cotton jacket,
some copper coins and a lodging in a cellar. And the worker, who for twelve hours weaves,
spins, drills turns, builds, shovels, breaks stones, carries loads, etc. – does he consider this
twelve hours’ weaving, spinning, drilling, turning, building, shovelling, stone breaking as
a manifestation of his life, as life? On the contrary, life begins for him where this activity
ceases, at table, in the public house, in bed. (“Wage Labour and Capital” 204-205)
The alienated worker thus never enjoys the fruits of his own labor, instead being forced, under
threat of poverty and death, to relinquish his life for the sake of producing the life of others. He
receives a meager compensation, most of which is spent on the most basic necessities for existence,
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e.g., food, housing, water, electricity. The modern proletarian endures some 40 years of this, at
minimum.
But what is returned to the human being at the end of history, for Marx, is this speciesbeing. Communism is meant to embody the real, material resolution of all the contradictions that
have defined the organization of human society thus far, and more than this, it is the end of alienation. It is the final reconciliation between the beautiful and remarkable potentiality of the human
being and the suffocation of it via alienated labor:
…while in communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each
can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt
in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just
as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd, or critic.” (“The
German Ideology” 160)
Species-being is thus the assumption that underlies the whole of the “Manuscripts,” and the Marxist concept of alienation cannot be comprehended without it.
But species-being does not suffice if we are to totally understand the nature of alienation.
It is, to me, an overly abstract and metaphysically leaden manner of grasping alienated subjectivity,
described in much the same way a physicist describes the movement of the cosmos than explored
in its immanence. That is why we have chosen to argue for this new concept of being-in-capital.
Moreover, the method of Daseinsanalyse Heidegger has supplied to us in the works we have investigated has, as we have said, allowed us to structure the derivation of Dasein’s self and worldunderstanding according to five sources of intelligibility: the tool, the sign, the artwork, language,
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and Das Man. The limiting of the sources to only these five is a practical move on my part, as
Dasein is infinitely more complex than to ground its identity on only five entities.
So, we return to them in full. The very last task that remains for us in this chapter is to
demonstrate how these five sources of intelligibility appear in capitalism, and how they consequently determine the nature of Dasein’s self and world-understanding. We do this by navigating
through five corresponding Heideggerian Daseinsanalysen. Accompanying (and at times contrasting) these will be the four types of alienation that Marx, working from his notion of speciesbeing, detailed in the “The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844.” Finally, we will close
by looking to Detroit.
§22. Dasein I & Alienated Product
This Dasein is a quite poor one. Not so poor as to be homeless or entirely isolated – she
has a steady job at a maquiladora in Mexico, where she has been tasked with putting together
respirator masks, to be used later in American hospitals. At home, she has three small children
waiting for her. Her husband works at a nearby automotive shop. Their income, when combined,
allows them to get by – from paycheck to paycheck, at least. Their basic necessities are met, but
always tenuously, uncertainly. Because of this, she experiences a strange sort of anxious boredom
in her everyday life. At least partially, this is because her weekly routine is so monotonous. From
Monday to Friday, and sometimes Saturday, her day is taken up with shifts at the plant. Sunday is
the only time she is able to “rest,” though she preoccupies herself with providing for her family
then.
She wishes that she could spend more time with those that matter to her, but there is no
necessity as powerful as economic necessity. She accepts this, although it is not as if she had much
of a choice in doing so. In response, she dutifully wakes each weekday morning at five (and
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sometimes on Saturdays), readying herself and making sure to leave breakfast prepared for her
children. Upon arriving to the manufacturing plant and clocking in, she dons the usual hairnet,
facemask, and protective apron. Taking up at her usual post, she greets 19 of her other coworkers
– all 20 of them involved in the production of a single respirator mask. She indicates to her supervisor that she is ready to work, and the engine of the assembly line groans. Scattered parts of
silicone and surgical steel begin their crawl, and it will not end until some 10 hours later.
Some hours in, to distract herself, she recalls certain moments in her childhood. Those
activities for which we all have some degree of talent tend to reveal themselves during childhood,
and her talent was drawing. She silently laments that she never had the opportunity to pursue it. If
she had, she wonders to herself, she would have created great artworks that, more than anything,
would have given her a voice. She would have spoken through these artworks, and those with ears
to listen would have heard her.
Translated into philosophical terms, the dolorous position of our maquiladora worker is
analogous to the silversmith’s: we can imagine him expressing a similar lament once he has been
replaced by machines that have no Being of their own or, in truth, any concern for it. This form of
alienation – that of the worker from the product of their labor – is, in a certain manner, the form of
alienation most central to being-in-capital. It also corresponds most directly to Dasein’s self and
world-understanding as derived from the tool, through the phenomenological faculty of Zuhandenheit. Though, by now, many pages separate us from our initial investigation of alētheia and
Zuhandenheit, their relation has not changed. We uncover the world practically, materially, when
we work on or endeavor to create something. Zuhandenheit is the phenomenological mode Dasein
enters into when it produces something, anything, and as we read in “The Question Concerning

96

Technology,” this production, embodied in the four causes, constitutes an imparting of Being into
the object.
This is what we mean when we say that this maquiladora worker speaks through the object.
A drawing of hers represents a poiēsis, a bringing-to-presence, of only something she could have
ever said, but the mass capitalist industrialization that has reduced her to the status of one machine
among many does not allow her this. Instead, it stifles her voice:
The worker becomes all the poorer the more wealth he produces, the more his production
increases in power and range. The worker becomes an ever-cheaper commodity the more
commodities he creates. With the increasing value of the world of things proceeds in direct
proportion the devaluation of the world of men. Labour produces not only commodities; it
produces itself and the worker as a commodity – and does so in the proportion in which it
produces commodities generally. This fact expresses merely that the object which labour
produces – labour’s product – confronts it as something alien, as a power independent of
the producer. The product of labour is labour which has been congealed in an object, which
has become material: it is the objectification of labour. (“The Economic and Philosophic
Manuscripts of 1844” 72)
Dasein injects its Being into the tools that it takes into its hands, but this Being, under capitalism,
is snuffed out. She is not allowed her role as causa efficiens. It, and she, fall prey to the liquidation
that comes to characterize being-in-capital. The world that Dasein makes, through the application
of its own labor, is thus perceived as, as Marx writes, an alien power – a power that is not known
as historical, but falsely grasped as eternal.
Compounding this is the proliferation of the sign that is so prominent in advanced capitalist
societies. Each day, this Dasein is bombarded with a great plague of advertisements, every one of
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them promising her some desired quality (provided she can afford it). The advertisement is indeed
a fantastic example of a phenomenological sign, but at the same time, it is too simplistic to adequately communicate just how deeply being-in-capital is ingrained into Dasein today. We spoke
of the sign as announcing something to Dasein, as providing it with a series of signposts with
which to orient itself along one path or another – and even on a monotonous factory floor, there
are plenty. Our Dasein straightens and works a little harder whenever she spots one of her managers
walking by, their suit and tie distinguishing them from the simple garments of her and her coworkers.
§23. Dasein II & Alienated Production
Let us now continue onward to another Dasein, quite unlike our first. We are no longer in
a Mexican maquiladora, but in the city of Prague, back when it still belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. At this moment in history, the city finds itself on the precipice of a great social and
economic upheaval, like most of Europe. Industrialization has now started to crawl into all aspects
of Austro-Hungarian society, and with it, bureaucratization. In the city’s old center, our second
Dasein, a young man, busies himself with the daily toil of an insurance investigator. He freely
admits to himself, along with his family and friends, that he very much dislikes his occupation. In
truth, it is really only that kind of employment sought out so that one can pay the bills. So, to feel
as if he is actually living, this Dasein occupies his nights and free time in general with the writingout of a series of strange, surrealistic short stories, in which the protagonists tend to find themselves
lost in great bureaucratic mazes.
He knows for a fact that only he, only his imagination, could have birthed these stories.
Much like the maquiladora worker, thinking of her drawings half a world away and a century in
the future, his creativity, embodied in the production of these writings, allow him an expression of
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his unique historical Being. Not so when he is in the mire of the insurance company, neck-deep in
contracts and legal texts. The production that occurs here could be performed by anyone else, and
this, indeed, is the second way in which the worker is estranged – from the act of production itself:
[this labor] does not belong to his essential being; that in his work, therefore, he does not
affirm himself but denies himself, does not feel content but unhappy, does not develop
freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins his mind. The worker
therefore only feels himself outside his work, and in his work feels outside himself. He is
at home when he is not working, and when he is working he is not at home. (“The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844” 74)
There is no dignity to the repetitiveness and soullessness of his work at the company. He is not at
home in this labor, as he is when he is penning his stories. Nevertheless, this imposed-upon labor
appears as a necessity from the point of view of this Dasein, whose Being is routinely covered
over by such tasks. After all, he has to pay his bills. The company does not preoccupy himself with
his Being either, being only concerned with the matrices of efficiency, productivity, and profit.
This form of alienation harmonizes most readily with the artwork, as another source of
intelligibility. “The Origin of the Work of Art” characterized the wrinkled shoes of the peasant
woman as being indicative of her unique Being – and the same holds for the stories of this unnamed
author, so concerned with metamorphoses and penal colonies. When we read his writings, we come
to know him, come to know his world, his individual configuration of history, society, culture, of
Being. So, it is the standardization and mechanization of production that no longer speaks to the
Being of Dasein, and no longer permits it to speak through it either. The artwork, whose creation
is gradually colonized by marketing executives, producers, publishers, and so on, is no longer a
conduit of Being. It is a conduit of capital.
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§24. Dasein III & Alienation from Others
Our third Dasein is a young woman, employed at a small tech company founded only a
few years ago in San Francisco, California. As is so common with corporations that aim to exude
an air of anything but exploitation (despite that being exactly what they do), this particular one
insists on fomenting a culture of familiarity between its employees. The whole corporate structure,
from the lowliest technician to the owner, is therefore cast into some sort of perverse remaking of
the nuclear family. Corporate social events are a regular feature, and the offices themselves have
been remodeled. The cubicle is now an artifact of an antiquated past. Though desks are still present,
our Dasein, when sitting at her computer, is in the midst of a sea of faces, all of which have a clear
line of sight to one another. At one corner of the office is a space for small lunches and coffee
breaks, and at the other, even piles of well-worn beanbags, meant to convince one that work does
not have to be work.
But the most apparent apprehension of this Dasein-not-as-Dasein comes in the form of
language. The higher-level managers and executives always put forward a great effort to grasp
each member of the company as a member of the family, and any attempt at discussing the matter
of pay, or of working hours, is seen as disruptive to the family. The corporate memos reflect this,
always making sure to remind everyone of the need for cooperation, for deference. Of course, this
is all nominal: it is intrinsic to being-in-capital that this Dasein stands in opposition to others.
Though our startup employee is addressed by her coworkers (and addresses them in turn) with
casual amicability, she is engaged in an antagonism with them. Her levels of productivity, efficiency, and profit generation are constantly under the gaze of her supervisors, and her fellow workers stand ready to take her place should she be deemed unsatisfactory and fired from her post. It is
not that being-in-capital somehow corrupts these Dasein morally; rather, it pressures them
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materially into viewing one another as a competitor, an adversary. Other Dasein are no longer
Dasein, with their own potentialities of Being. They are obstacles in our pursuit of higher wages,
prestigious promotions, and gainful employment:
If the worker’s activity is a torment to him, to another it must be delight and his life’s
joy…If his own activity is to him an unfree activity, then he is treating it as activity performed in the service, under the dominion, the coercion and the yoke of another man. (“The
Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844” 78)
The bonds of community dissolve. For Marx, we stand in opposition to these others; for Heidegger,
we lose ourselves to them. We have argued that being-in-capital is distinguished by the fact that
the commodity, inscribed with the phenomenology of capitalism, speaks to no one at all. We see
this repeated here – in the dissemination of labor that is neither freely chosen nor addressed to each
Dasein’s potentiality, Dasein loses itself to the they. Our examination of being-in-capital has, at
last, come to an end.
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Fig. 12: Mariners’ Church & Renaissance Center – Edgar M. Llamas – Detroit, MI – 2019

102

Chapter 3 – Detroit
§25. The Motor City
This would be an awfully sour note to end the thesis on. Heidegger already tends to be
parodied as a philosopher of doom and gloom, and Marx as one of revolutionary rage and violence.
If we simply threw our hands up in surrender now, we might as well have never started the work,
given that its ultimate purpose aims toward liberation and not despair. We must remember what
we asked at the beginning of all this: “What matters to you?” The entire premise of this thesis
flows out of this question. As we have said, while Marxism is unmatched in its ability to describe
the historical and economic movements of capital and its predecessors, it is not concerned with
what matters to the proletarian – and liberation consists, at least partially, in the recognition and
respect of what matters to us. This is why we have come to involve Heidegger, and why we have
come to investigate being-in-capital. Our ambitions have been to lay the foundation for a
Heideggerian Marxism, a phenomenology of capitalism, and lastly, to provide a remedy for Marx’s
weak theory of alienated subjectivity.
Our theoretical exposition of being-in-capital has come to an end. But there is still the
matter of how it is seen in a living and (barely) breathing city – one whom, by virtue of its past, is
very relevant for our ambitions. Detroit, Michigan was once one of the most prosperous and populated cities in the United States, rivaling other major urban centers like Los Angeles, New York
City, and Chicago. But, shortly after the end of World War II, it underwent a change. Employment,
once abundant and well-paying, fled to other parts of the world. Social ills that had long plagued
the city, such as an immense lack of housing and racial discrimination, intensified. A mass exodus
occurred, leaving Detroit severely depopulated. A heart of industry and opportunity decayed into
a smattering of abandoned manufacturing plants and crumbling homes.
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Neither its past nor its future are simple. Today, it is as if the Detroiter stands at a crossroads, tempted by the Devil on one side, and enticed by the unknown on the other. And the city is
full of these little oppositions – small restaurants in Mexicantown teem with life while, only a few
blocks away, the ghosts of towering smokestacks, of what was, haunt the earth. High-rise apartment buildings, now gentrified, loom over the city’s center while some of its unhoused wander the
streets, looking for whatever means of subsistence they can find. Pictured above, the Renaissance
Center, General Motors’ global headquarters, stands imposingly over the very small, very old, and
very frail Mariners’ Church. It is as if the edifices themselves are now asking the Detroiter, “What
way?” And the answer is not apparent. There is no returning to the past as, in a manner of a speaking, capitalism has come and gone. The future remains unknown. The only thing that is left is the
reclamation of the present.
Detroit is thus important to this thesis on two grounds: it allows us to see the emergence of
everyday being-in-capital more acutely, and it can serve fantastically well as a site for possibly
resisting it. How it will be resisted is outside of the scope of this thesis – and not out of practicality
either. As a historical community, only Detroiters can answer for themselves what they desire for
their future, their present, and for the integration of the past. Much like the prior work we have
completed, though, being-in-capital’s presence in Detroit requires preparation.
The key to understanding the relationship of Detroit to capitalism is its history; more specifically, the history of the second half of its 20th century. That will be our first concern, and we
will primarily employ sociologist Thomas J. Sugrue’s The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and
Inequality in Postwar Detroit as our guide to piecing it all together. I should stipulate here that this
thesis, being largely concerned with capitalism, has heretofore treated class as the primary determinant element in Dasein’s being-in-the-world. We cannot do the same from here onward. Detroit
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was, and remains, a deeply segregated city, and it absolutely cannot be understood as a phenomenon without referring to race at all. And being-in-capital, like capitalism itself, exerts its influence
on different Dasein in differing ways.
Upon concluding our recounting of Detroit’s recent history, we will turn to a book written
by a native of the city: Detroit: An American Autopsy by Charlie LeDuff. The text is similarly
laden with historical, economic, and sociological facts (albeit to a lesser extent than Sugrue’s), but
we are not interested in it for this. Rather, what it will do for us is permit us a glimpse into the real,
concrete methods in which being-in-capital comes to influence, and even reconstitute, Dasein’s
interpretation of the world and of itself. Following all this – and following more than a hundred
pages of dense philosophical and sociological labor – we return to Heideggerian Marxism as such
for a few final words. There are still many questions regarding it that this thesis leaves unanswered,
and they must be acknowledged. They may be revisited in a future work.
§26. Panic in Detroit
Detroit is a city of crises – but it was not always so. At the turn of the 20th century, it became
home to the three great American automotive manufacturers: Ford, Chrysler, and General Motors,
along with other, now-defunct companies like Packard and Hudson. Spurred forward by what
would later be termed Fordism, these new industrialists revolutionized Detroit’s landscape, along
with the nature of its means, relations, and forces of production. As recounted by Thomas Sugrue:
“Factories, shops, and neighborhoods blurred together indistinguishably, enmeshed in a relentless
grid of streets and a complex web of train lines. To the casual observer, the design of Detroit
seemed anarchic” (18). This anarchy, at least at the time, was one of growth. The originating of a
massive automotive industry in the city – and the resultant explosion of employment – drew thousands to it, hoping to make reality their own version of the American Dream. Detroit’s first crisis
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came in the Great Depression of 1929, but its turnaround was swift, great, and unexpected. The
great global war against fascism, World War II, breathed new life into Detroit. War, more than just
requiring the logistics of soldiers and officers, requires the logistics of great machinery and materiel, and the automotive industrialists seized upon the opportunity like no other:
Between 1940 and 1947, manufacturing employment in Detroit increased by 40 percent, a
rate surpassed only by Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Chicago. Demand for heavy industrial goods skyrocketed during World War II, and Detroit’s industrialists positioned
themselves to take advantage of the defense boom…making metropolitan Detroit one of
the birthplaces of the military-industrial complex. Observers christened the city ‘Detroit
the Dynamic,’ the ‘arsenal of democracy’ for a war-torn world. Almost overnight, Detroit
had gone from one of the most depressed urban areas in the country to a boomtown…The
rapid expansion of wartime production drastically reduced unemployment in the city. Between 1940 and 1943, the number of unemployed workers in Detroit fell from 135,000 to a
mere 4,000. (Sugrue 19)
The influx of new laborers was both American and non-American, but more importantly, mostly
black: “Fewer than 10 percent of Detroit’s population at the outbreak of World War II, African
Americans comprised more than a quarter of the city’s residents by 1960” (22). Given the general
social climate of the United States at the time – Jim Crow in the South and “casual” racism in the
North – these African-Americans came to Detroit en masse in a phenomenon referred to as the
Great Migration.
Their arrival did not go unnoticed. Detroit took upon the unpleasant (to put it euphemistically) status as a hotbed of the Ku Klux Klan in the 1920s, and the visible violence of the Klan was
accompanied by the subtle violence of structural racism. The new black residents of the city more
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or less congregated in the neighborhood called Black Bottom, but when, for lack of space or unsuitable dwellings – both of which would be a recurring problem in Detroit’s history – they tried
to move outward into the white areas of the city, they faced the discrimination they looked to
escape when they left the South:
White neighborhoods, especially enclaves of working-class homeowners, interpreted the
influx of blacks as a threat and began to defend themselves against the newcomers, first by
refusing to sell to blacks, then by using force and threats of violence against those who
attempted to escape the black sections of the city, and finally by establishing restrictive
covenants to assure the homogeneity of neighborhoods. (24)
The covenants, in particular, are especially good at provoking indignation. So deep-seated was the
legal enshrinement of racist superiority at this point in the country’s history that Detroit’s black
population were left to their own devices, even in the midst of a housing shortage:
More than 80 percent of property in Detroit outside of the inner city (bounded by Grand
Boulevard) fell under the scope of racial restrictions…A typical racial covenant stipulated
that property along Seebaldt Avenue between Firwood and Beechwood Avenues on Detroit’s near Northwest Side ‘shall not be used or occupied by any person or persons except
those of the Caucasian race.’ (45)
And, to make matters worse, Detroit’s city planners were convinced that the ideal parts of the city
to raze for the construction of highways were the already-overpopulated black neighborhoods,
further displacing the families therein (47). Surely, with this sort of oppression, one cannot blame
the city’s African-American population for rioting; neither in 1943 nor in 1967.
This discrimination was not confined to the realtor’s office. Banks and other moneylenders
“…systematically refused to lend to blacks who were among the first to move to all-white
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neighborhoods or to developers building new homes for blacks near white neighborhoods…blacks
found it almost impossible to get conventional home financing” (47). And the factory floor, which
promised financial security for its new workers, kept its promise only selectively. The racists that
sought to keep black workers out of their neighborhoods for some perceived inferiority, whether
moral or intellectual, did the same there: “Race became a proxy for a number of characteristics
that [employers] believed would affect the efficiency of a work force and the profitability of a firm.
Many employers, basing their decisions on racial stereotypes, assumed that black workers would
be unproductive, prone to high absenteeism, and unreliable” (95). In the comparatively rare instances African-Americans were hired, they were often placed into the most undesirable positions,
e.g., as janitors, or in those parts of the automotive plants in which the workers regularly risked
their lives. They were the last to be hired and the first to be laid off – and so, although all of
Detroit’s population, white or black, American or non-American, bore the pain of the city’s deindustrialization, none were subjected to more of its severe effects than its black population.
Detroit’s deindustrialization is generally pointed to by the casually familiar with the city as
the reason for its decline. This is more or less accurate, but the mechanism of “deindustrialization,”
like any other historical phenomenon, is caused by a number of constituent events and processes.
These must be grasped if the city’s decline is to be understood holistically. Sugrue identifies quite
a few contributing factors, but they can more or less be reduced down to two general tendencies:
corporate decentralization and technological automation. Both can be very easily interpreted as an
outpouring of the ever-present capitalist desire to increase his profit margins, but their manifestation has not been the same.
The flight of industrial corporations from Detroit can be said, roughly, to have begun in the
1950s: “In 1950, 56 percent of all automobile employment in the United States was in Michigan;
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by 1960, that figure had fallen to 40 percent” (128). And their motivations for leaving the city and
setting up elsewhere were far from an act of philanthropy. Rather, “…decentralization was not
simply a response to the inexorable demands of the market; it was an outgrowth of the social
relations of production itself. Decentralization was an effective means for employers to control
increasing labor costs and weaken powerful unions” (128). Detroit, being a center of industrial
production, perhaps showcased the struggle between capital and labor better than any other – but,
of course, a member of the bourgeoisie, having vast wealth at his disposal, is able to relocate his
enterprise much more easily than a proletarian can move elsewhere to find employment. Though
the United Auto Workers and Teamsters indeed were powerful, to name only a few of the labor
unions active in Detroit at the time, that influence could never have stretched across the entire
nation.
Compounding this initial transgression is the arrival of automation. The first offense was
committed by those corporations that chose to leave Detroit; the second, by those that remained
and sought to replace their workers with machines. The allure of automation for the bourgeoisie is
plain. One worker may produce one clock in 20 hours, but a machine can triple or quadruple that
speed. And most importantly for the capitalist, it does not need to be repeatedly paid, only purchased, then maintained. Sugrue writes in regard,
Automation offered two major benefits to manufacturers: it promised both to increase output and to reduce labor costs…Before the introduction of automated engine production at
Ford’s Cleveland plant, it took 117 workers to produce 154 engine blocks per hour; after
automation the same output required a mere 41 workers. (130)
Moreover, much like decentralization, it had the consequence of severely limiting the power of
labor in determining its own future and standard of living. Machines do not argue, go on strike, or
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damage corporate property as an act of resistance. They only produce, and it is this that further
seduces the capitalist to them.
As would be expected by now, Detroit’s black community suffered the worst of automation’s effects. Sugrue offers up the example of one of Ford’s manufacturing plants, located in River
Rouge, just south of Detroit itself:
The plant was also the largest employer of blacks in the Detroit area…In 1950, Rouge
workers assembled all Ford and Mercury engines; by 1954, Ford had shifted all engine
production to the new automated Cleveland plant…Stamping, machine casting, forging,
steel production, glassmaking, and dozens of other operations were shifted from the Rouge
to new Ford plants throughout the 1950s. As a result, employment at the Rouge fell from
85,000 in 1945, to 54,000 in 1954, to only 30,000 in 1960…Where 950 workers made piston
connecting rods at the Rouge, they were replaced by two units of 146 workers each at
Cleveland and Dearborn, resulting in a net loss of 804 jobs in the Detroit area. (132-133)
The capitalists that found their fortune in Detroit chose to grow it elsewhere. And what they left in
the stead of their wealth became, in essence, a carcass, of a city and of a people. The city’s decline
has continued up until the present moment, with the municipal government filing the largest bankruptcy case in American history in 2013 (Davey and Walsh). The tragedy is ongoing – but so many
pages ago, we asked the question: “What matters to you?” Now we ask it to the Detroiter.
§27. Inner City Blues
Charlie LeDuff, a native of the city, opens his book Detroit: An American Autopsy with the
following:
This is a book about living people getting on with the business of surviving in a place that
has little use for anyone anymore except those left here. It is about waking up one morning
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and being told you are obsolete and not wanting to believe it but knowing it’s true. It is a
book about a rough town and a tough people during arguably some of the most historic and
cataclysmic years in the American experience. It is a book about family and cops and criminals and factory workers. It is about corrupt politicians and a collapsing newspaper. It is
about angry people fighting and crying and snatching hold of one another trying to stay
alive.” (LeDuff 11)
The philosophical question that underlies this entire thesis is expressed in this. We have heretofore
spoken of capitalism and Heideggerian Marxism and being-in-capital, but what is truly at stake in
a city such as Detroit is the contradiction between structure and agency. Though we may accept or
deny it, our agency, our potentiality-of-being-a-self, is limited and determined by great powers that
appear to stand over against us. And these structures themselves, almost paradoxically, are created
by nothing other than human agency.
But, we now wonder, how does a people react when the structures they threw their Being
into have left them? What is left to be done when the only things that remain are the corpses of
prosperity and joy, suffusing the air with a miasma of poverty, addiction, disease, and crime? This
is why we look to LeDuff’s book. It is one thing to describe the phenomenological structures of
the everyday lived experience of Dasein, and valuable work indeed. But these structures do not
take flight, in all their fullness and philosophical potency, until they are filled with historical, social, and phenomenological content. Dasein – and the proletarian – find life when they become a
Dasein and a proletarian, caught in the river of the world, struggling against its currents.
Though this thesis has steadily descended from the peaks of philosophical theory, it is Detroit: An American Autopsy that, at last, permits us to glimpse the human refuse of capitalism, and
its continued dominion over them via being-in-capital. The first of these glimpses comes in the
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form of LeDuff’s encounter with Mike Nevin, “a balls-out, high-energy guy with a potato nose
and an outrageous mullet hairdo – short in the front, party in the back” (48). Nevin, noticing
LeDuff’s presence, spoke of his situation to the journalist:
‘In this town, arson is off the hook. Thousands of them a year, bro. In Detroit, it’s so fucking
poor that fire is cheaper than a movie. A can of gas is three-fifty and a movie is eight bucks,
and there aren’t any movie theaters left in Detroit, so fuck it. They burn the empty house
next door and they sit on the fucking porch with a forty, and they’re barbecuing and laughing ‘cause it’s fucking entertainment. It’s unbelievable. And the old lady living next door,
she don’t have insurance, and her house goes up in flames and she’s homeless and another
fucking block dies.’ (49)
Recall that being-in-capital constitutes a change in Dasein’s self and world-understanding. There
is a mode of being-in-the-world that is caused by and unique to capitalism, and this mode is structurally delimited and phenomenologically experienced. We see an instance of it here. In a city that
has not been left starved and beaten by repeated exoduses of both capital and human beings, no
one bothers to burn a house out of a need for entertainment. For warmth, maybe, but then one must
ask why it would be more helpful to burn a shelter than stay inside it. Again, LeDuff has an answer:
A square mile of industrial decay, scavengers had descended upon [the abandoned Packard
plant], ushering in a marathon game of cat and mouse. The scavengers, looking for metal
to sell at the scrap yard, light a section of the building on fire. After the firemen dutifully
extinguish the blaze, the scavengers return to help themselves to the neatly exposed girders
and I-beams that form the skeleton of the structure. (51)
Nevin replies, dejectedly, “It’s like we work for the fucking scrappers” (52).
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Another example involves LeDuff’s own brother, Billy, who was employed at a machine
shop at the time the book was written. Some time before, he had been working at Quicken Loans,
handling mortgages and making a comfortable amount of money. LeDuff describes his brother as
“a semi-brilliant guy, great with numbers,” but the real estate crash of 2008 displaced him. (88).
At the mercy of great macroeconomic forces like the millions of laborers that preceded him, Billy
saw his wealth evaporate. And this evaporation, in the manner it always forces the disenfranchised
to get creative in the most tragic ways possible, forced him as well: “There was no health care
offered here. What constituted a dental plan came from a toolbox. That is, my brother attempted
to take out an abscessed molar with a pair of pliers. The molar snapped below the gum line” (89).
The third iteration of being-in-capital happens a few days later after LeDuff’s visit to his
brother Billy. Frankie, another of LeDuff’s siblings, calls him late at night. Frankie liked to spend
his time in Detroit exploring its many abandoned buildings, not to scavenge, but to document what
is left when someone leaves. That night, at the Roosevelt Warehouse on 14th and Marantette,
Frankie found a frozen body at the bottom of an elevator shaft; feet up, barely visible (121). Charlie
calls the Detroit Police Department, and – quite lazily – they send out a patrol car. The situation
snowballs, growing in both intensity and absurdity, until the fire department arrives, armed with
chainsaws to free this John Doe from his icy prison. As LeDuff and his brother exit the office of
The Detroit News later that night, “A tall British cameraman could only laugh at the attention the
frozen man was now getting. ‘The people actually alive in this city can’t get an ambulance to show
up and Mr. Freeze down there has half the fire department helping him’” (126). The slovenliness
and frigidity which with the police – over the course of “two days and five phone calls” – responded to the dead man’s body led LeDuff to write an article about him, but more specifically,
about the callousness with which a human being’s death was treated (127). LeDuff speaks:

113

Bailouts, credit-default swaps, international trade blocs. These things were too amorphous,
too complex to get your mind around. But a human being left in a crumbling elevator shaft.
Everyone could understand that. Had it reached the point of anarchy? a [sic] reporter from
Barcelona asked me by telephone. Funny things happen when you run out of money, I told
her. (128-129)
“Funny things” indeed. Although what seems most reprehensible about a man forgotten at the
bottom of an elevator shaft is that it belies a sense of resignation, of defeat. The inanity of such a
death, recognized as such anywhere else, appears to be taken as normal in Detroit. And when it is
not, it is looked upon as a piece of sensationalistic entertainment, same as cheap pornography or
an abandoned home, going up in flames.
The last instance of being-in-capital we will grapple with from Detroit: An American Autopsy concerns a 15-year-old girl named Martha Barnett. In a truly tragic case of a gangland hit
gone wrong, she was killed in a drive-by shooting by someone named DeAndre Woolfolk. She –
nor anyone else in the car – were Woolfolk’s target, but the car she rode in was almost identical to
that of the mark’s (201-202). LeDuff was told Martha Barnett’s story by a Detroit detective, and
out of journalistic interest, he visited her grandmother, also named Martha. He asked her about her
granddaughter, and she told him about her funeral:
‘So many people was [sic] there, so many young people. I didn’t know all those young
people loved so much. Well, in the middle of the funeral, during the songs, the funeral
director stopped the music right there in the middle of the service, and he brought me in
the back room and was asking how I was gonna pay for it. I didn’t rightly know. I should
have passed the hat right there. Everybody would have given, praise God. But I didn’t pass
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the hat. So I had her cremated. I had to borrow and beg just to do that. Even her father
chipped in.’ (208)
At the risk of sounding less like a stereotypically disinterested academic, if such is the sort of
society we endure – a society in which a grieving grandmother is coldly asked how she’ll pay for
her granddaughter’s funeral, in the middle of it – then there is little about it worth saving.
This is the effect of being-in-capital. Deprived of the material means to a full, joyful,
healthy life, a few arsonists entertain themselves by lighting an empty house on fire. Frankie
LeDuff, lacking health insurance, botches a tooth extraction with a pair of pliers, as if he were a
deformed screw stuck in the machines at his shop. Johnnie Lewis Redding, unceremoniously dead
at the bottom of an elevator shaft, annoys the police into retrieving his body (138). Martha Barnett,
grandmother, is given no choice but to cremate Martha Barnett, granddaughter – for a reason as
compelling as cost.
This is the world that being-in-capital reveals to Dasein. This is the void. Actuated through
the commodity and expressed in the voice of Das Man, it causes Dasein to address itself, other
Dasein, and the world as a rent to be charged, a price to be paid, a check to be cashed. The simple
joy of seeing things and people as what they are dissolves, falling prey to capitalist-technological
enframing, as the woodsman fell prey in “The Question Concerning Technology.” We appear to be
caught in being-in-capital’s web, without any sort of outstretched hand to save us from its encroaching fangs. And this web is enmeshed with the structure and rhythm of our everyday lives.
Imagining the end of the world is easier than imagining an alternative. But perhaps it does not need
to be imagined – only made reality. History, as the product of all humanity, has marched on, regardless of the machinations of popes, presidents, emperors, and all civilizations. And this world
seems invincible to us. But, then again, “So did the divine right of kings.” (Le Guin)
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§28. The Question of Heideggerian Marxism
We are finished – or, at least, finished for the time being. The only remnant of work we
have left now is to explicitly address some of the themes and questions that surround this thesis;
some of which have been intentionally avoided, some of which have not. In the introduction, I
mentioned that a fully developed Heideggerian Marxism has not yet been born. Its history is a long
and difficult one, and not one that can be dispensed with easily. More than only struggling with
reconciling Karl Marx and Martin Heidegger, it also requires that one take a definitive position
upon such concepts as humanism and anti-humanism, the value of industrial progress versus ecological preservation, and so on. Dedicating time to these questions would have certainly turned a
thesis into a dissertation, to reference a bit of a running joke over the last 116 pages.
Perhaps the gravest matter is Heidegger’s political history. The specter of communism
haunts Europe, but the specter of Nazism may – or may not, depending on who one asks – haunt
Being and Time and the rest of the Heideggerian canon. This is in itself a very contentious point
of debate within academic philosophy, but, in the writing of this thesis, I have decided to interpret
Heidegger’s works as separate from his flirtation with fascism. To me, certain parts appear so
potentially liberatory as to be nearly anarchistic. This being said, such a position must be historically and philosophically justified if Heideggerian Marxism is to be fully developed.
Our ambitions, as we said, were threefold: to argue for the possibility of a Heideggerian
Marxism, to provide a stronger alternative to Marx’s theory of alienated species-being, and to create the bedrock for a larger theory of subjectivity. This last endeavor – while being the most philosophically fruitful, in my opinion – is also the most complex. Therefore, being-in-capital was
(and is currently not) intended to supply a complete framework through which to comprehend
Dasein’s self and world-understanding. The five sources of intelligibility are, as stated, not nearly
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enough to complete such a task. Dasein, the being for which its Being is an issue, is infinitely more
complex than only five sources. So, a robust theory of subjectivity lies far beyond only these 117
pages.
Relating to this possible theory of subjectivity is the matter of existential authenticity and
inauthenticity. Some readers may recall that, in Chapter 1, I made free use of such terms. This is
due to the fact that Heidegger employs them. In truth, I have deliberately avoided making a definitive statement on the problem of existential authenticity as it relates to being-in-capital. This is
because doing so, in my opinion, veers a little too closely to arbitrarily defining some experiences
as “false” and others as “true.”
The very last point concerns the motivation behind this thesis: liberation. Though I have
not said it as explicitly as possible, the attentive reader will have almost certainly surmised by now
that this work is deeply anti-capitalist. The reason for this is because capitalism, despite being
touted as the greatest and most productive period of human history by its supporters, has come at
a cost – a cost that is rarely acknowledged, because we are rarely made to acknowledge it. Especially here in the West, it is all too easy to cover over the price paid in blood with the price paid in
dollars. Liberation consists at least partially in the recognition and respect of what matters to us.
But capitalism is only concerned with what matters to the wealthy, the bourgeois. It resolves historical Being into the void.
As Charlie LeDuff has written, “…the Detroiter may be the most important American there
is because no one knows better than he that we’re all standing at the edge of the shaft” (7). His
situation seems hopeless – but he has not yet jumped. Neither have we. And so, the final question
comes to light: will we?
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Fig. 13: René Magritte – The Lovers II – 1928
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